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Estimating the Impact of Immigrants on the Host Country 




In this paper, I estimate the fiscal impact of immigrants on the German pension insurance 
(PI) and unemployment insurance (UI) systems when return migration is an endogenous 
choice. For this purpose, I develop a dynamic stochastic model of joint return migration and 
saving decisions that accounts for uncertainty in future employment and income and estimate 
this model using a longitudinal data set on immigrants from five different source countries. I 
find that allowing for the endogeneity of the return decision makes a substantial difference in 
the net gain of the PI and UI systems from immigrants. Exogenous return migration – which 
has been the practice of the literature so far – underestimates the net gain for almost all 
demographic groups and the amount of underestimation is remarkable for several 
demographic groups. In addition, age-at-arrival profiles of net contributions of immigrants – 
which form the basis of suggestions on selective immigration policies in the literature – are 
rotated significantly. Finally, a counterfactual policy experiment in which cash bonuses are 
provided conditional on return to unemployed immigrants turns out be ineffective in terms of 
reducing the burden on the state coffers for most demographic groups. 
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Many European countries are facing a social security crisis due to an aging native popu-
lation, rising health costs, and low fertility rates. Börsch-Supan (2000) reports, based on
OECD projections, that the ratio of elderly to working age people will increase from 20.6
percent in 1990 to 39.2 percent in 2030 for European member countries. This rise is even
higher for Germany, the country this study addresses, where the old-age dependency ratio is
expected to increase from 21.7 percent in 1990 to 49.2 percent in 2030. Immigration could
be at least a partial solution to this problem not only because immigrants are more likely
to be contributing to the social security system rather than receiving beneﬁts due to their
a g ec o m p o s i t i o nb u ta l s ob e c a u s et h ei n ﬂow of immigrants has been high to European coun-
tries; e.g., between 1962 and 2005, 800 thousand immigrants entered Germany on average
per year. Therefore, immigration is a potential alternative to tax hikes, lower beneﬁts, or
delayed age of retirement within the social security system. On the other hand, high rates of
unemployment of immigrants resulting from poor economic integration could imply negative
net contributions to the social insurance system. For instance, the unemployment rate was
22.2 percent for immigrants in Germany at the end of 2004.
There has been a growing literature on the ﬁscal impact of immigrants. These studies
investigate whether this ﬁscal impact in net present value terms is positive and whether
immigration can have a substantial impact on the ﬁscal imbalance. However, all of these
studies treat return migration as an exogenous factor and approximate the aggregate level
of return migration. Exogenous return migration obviously fails to account for the potential
selection in the return decision according to immigrants’ characteristics. Moreover, the
aggregation of return behavior fails to capture the heterogeneity in the level and timing
of return migration behavior across various demographic groups. However, the empirical
literature on the return migration behavior of immigrants in Germany as well as in other
countries reports substantial variation according to their characteristics.1
Accounting for return migration properly is very important because the level of return
migration of immigrants to their home countries is signiﬁcant in many host countries. For
instance, according to German Federal Statistical Oﬃce, between 1962 and 2005, for every 80
in-migrants there were 56 out-migrants on average.2 Moreover, the variation in the incidence
1See, e.g., Kırdar (2009) for Germany, Reagen and Olsen (2000) for the U.S., and Lam (1994) for Canada.
2According to Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982), of the 1971 cohort of immigrants in the U.S., the fraction
that returned by 1979 could be as high as ﬁfty percent. Aydemir and Robinson (2006) ﬁnd an out-migration
1of return migration over immigrants’ duration of residence has important implications for
their ﬁscal impact. For instance, the timing of return migration determines whether immi-
grants qualify for pension beneﬁts before return or whether they can utilize early retirement
schemes that exist in countries like Germany. Finally, the type of selection in return migra-
tion is also quite important because whether immigrants become a burden or boon on the
social security system depends on whether the returners are selective of the most or least
economically successful immigrants.
This paper contributes to the literature by exploring for the ﬁr s tt i m et h eﬁscal impact of
immigrants when return migration is an endogenous choice. For this purpose, it develops and
estimates a dynamic model of joint return migration and saving decisions under uncertainty.
In the model, immigrants are subject to earnings, employment and preference shocks and
they make decisions about whether to stay in Germany for an additional period and how
much to save. Using this model that allows for selective emigration and pays due attention
to the institutional features in Germany, I calculate the net gain of the German pension
insurance (PI) and unemployment insurance (UI) systems from immigrants by country of
origin and age at arrival to Germany. Diﬀerences in immigrants’ life-expectancy as well as
in price levels and conditions in the labor market in the home country are incorporated via
nationality. The model also incorporates unobserved heterogeneity in a number of permanent
characteristics of immigrants like their preferences and labor market ability.
At the same time, developing a structural model that is estimable requires a number
of modeling simpliﬁcations. First, the model computes the net government gain from male
household heads only; those of their family members are ignored as this would require mod-
eling family structure dynamics including fertility decisions. Second, this study examines
the net gain of the PI and UI elements of the German social security system only; the third
layer of the social security system, health insurance, is not included because participation in
this insurance system entitles not only the immigrant himself but also his family to beneﬁts;
therefore, the calculation of the time proﬁle of beneﬁts would also require modeling the fam-
ily structure. Third, there is no calendar year in the model; consequently, the macro-level
variables in the model exhibit variation across the source countries but not over time.3
rate of 35 percent by 20 years of residence for working-age male immigrants in Canada.
3Not having calendar time, I could potentially miss the impact of a time trend in the macroeconomic
conditions; e.g. Spain saw an improvement in labor market conditions after joining the EU. However, these
changes would be much less important for older generations because most of the Spanish guestworkers were
beyond their prime-age when the positive changes in the Spanish labor market took place.
2The model is estimated using the immigrant sample of the German Socioeconomic Panel
(GSOEP), which is a longitudinal data set that started in 1984 with an initial sample of
immigrants from ﬁve diﬀerent source countries in Germany that include EU member (Greece,
Italy and Spain) as well as non-member countries (Turkey, ex-Yugoslavia). Since there is
no information on one of the state variables of the model (accumulated savings) in the
data set, I use the simulated maximum likelihood technique developed in Keane and Wolpin
(2001) which solves the problem of missing state variables in the estimation of dynamic
panel data models.4 The data set used in the estimation is a stock sample of immigrants
in Germany in 1984; therefore, I do not observe the immigrants who already returned by
1984. This structure of the data is also duely addressed in the estimation. The estimation
results indicate that the model can account very well for the key features of the micro data
according to EU status. In addition, I conduct external validations of the model, including
a replication of the return policy of 1983 in which unemployed immigrants were encouraged
to return home with cash bonuses, which yield comparable results to the actual changes.
The results show that the net gain of the German PI system from immigrants is positive
regardless of age-at-arrival and country of origin and large in magnitude, especially for
younger arrivers among non-EU immigrants. An important reason to this positive net gain is
that immigrants have a higher average age of retirement than natives because many return to
their home countries before they can take advantage of the various early retirement schemes
in Germany. The net gain of the UI system is also positive regardless of age-at-arrival for all
nationalities except for Turks for whom net contributions are close to zero for most age-at-
arrival groups. This looks surprising at ﬁrst given the high unemployment rates of immigrants
residing in Germany; however, immigrants who returned had a much lower average likelihood
of unemployment during their residence in Germany because unemployment rates were much
lower at the early periods in Germany for these immigrants.
Since the key contribution of this paper to the literature on the ﬁscal impact of immigrants
is the inclusion of return migration as an endogenous choice, I also investigate how net gains of
the two insurance systems from immigrants change in the case of exogenous return migration
that maintains the aggregate hazard rates by country of origin and duration of residence.5
Net gains of both PI and UI systems from immigrants fall for almost all demographic groups,
4There is information on saving ﬂows, though.
5Even this includes a higher level of heterogeneity than the previous studies because they do not account
for the timing of return migration or variation across countries.
3and the fall is substantial for many groups. For instance, net gain of the PI system falls
by more than 40 percent from Italian immigrants arriving after age 30 and by about 20
percent from Turkish immigrants arriving before age 40; net gains of the UI system from
Turks arriving after age 30 and Italians arriving before age 40 decrease by more than 25,000
DM, an amount that is almost equal to their annual earnings at arrival.
Storesletten (2000) suggests selective immigration policies according to immigrants’ age,
based on the age-at-arrival proﬁle of net government gain. However, this study also reveals
that exogenous return migration causes serious rotations in the age-at-arrival proﬁles. For
instance, while net PI contributions of 18-year-old Spanish entrants increase by 8.7 percent,
those of 40-year-old Spanish entrants fall by 27 percent; similarly, while net UI contributions
of 40-year-old Turkish entrants fall by 35,231 DM, those of 18-year-old Turkish entrants
decrease by only 1,162 DM.
A critical reason to the misestimation of the net government gain by exogenous return
migration is that it does not account for the selection in return migration in terms of labor
market outcomes. In particular, it does not capture the fact that unemployed immigrants
are more likely to return, particularly in earlier periods; and, therefore, it seriously underes-
timates net contributions. In addition, this counterfactual allows for limited heterogeneity
in return migration behavior. While it maintains the level and timing by country of origin,
it does not account for the signiﬁcant variation in the level and timing of return migration
as well as in the permanent unobserved characteristics across age-at-entry groups.
I also examine the impact of a counterfactual policy experiment in which cash bonuses are
provided to unemployed immigrants conditional on return. Given the high unemployment
r a t e so fi m m i g r a n t si nG e r m a n y ,i tc o u l db el e s se x p e n s i v ef o rt h eG e r m a ng o v e r n m e n t
to pay these one-time bonuses rather than unemployment beneﬁts for extended periods of
time. However, I ﬁnd that this policy is not eﬀective in decreasing the burden of unemployed
immigrants on the state coﬀers for most demographic groups. Since unemployed immigrants
are more likely to return anyway, the bonus becomes a gift to many immigrants. Moreover,
although this policy brings about extra returners, most of these are immigrants who would
return in the immediately following periods anyway.
The next section provides background information and reviews the relevant literature. In
section 3, the model and its solution are explained. Section 4 describes the data and presents
descriptive statistics. Section 5 covers the estimation method and section 6 presents the
estimation results. The impact of immigrants on the German PI and UI systems is discussed
4in section 7 and how this impact changes in the case of exogenous modeling of return decision
is left to section 8. A policy experiment in which cash bonuses conditional on return are
provided to unemployed immigrants is discussed in section 9. Section 10 concludes.
2 Background and Relevant Literature
2.1 Background Information
Immigrants constitute a signiﬁcant proportion of the German population. The German
Federal Statistics Oﬃce reports that foreigners and their descendants formed 8.9 percent
of the German population according to the 2005 microcensus. The level of in-migration to
Germany was quite high before 1984, when the initial wave of GSOEP was drawn: on average,
657 thousand immigrants (including ethnic Germans) entered Germany annually between
1962 and 1983, of which sixty- o n ep e r c e n tw e r ef r o mt h eﬁve source countries in this study
(German Federal Statistics Oﬃce). Most of these immigrants were the guestworkers of 1960’s
and early 1970’s who immigrated to Germany under the bilateral agreements signed by the
German government with the source country governments.6 As a result of the guestworker
recruitment schemes, the share of foreigners in German employment increased from 1.3% in
1960 to 11.9% in 1973, and the number of foreigners in Germany in 1973 rose to 4 millions
(German Federal Ministry of Interior). In 1973, after the oil price shocks, recruitment of
new immigrant workers came to a halt. However, immigration continued mostly in the form
of family reuniﬁcation, and the number of foreigners living in Germany in 1985 reached to
4.4 millions (German Federal Ministry of Interior).
2.2 Relevant Literature on Motives for Migration Decisions
Immigration decision can be rationalized in an income-maximizing model where migrants are
attracted to the destination because of higher wages there (see, e.g., Sjastaad, 1960; Harris
and Todaro, 1970). However, such a model would not be able to explain return migration
at the absence of a reversal of wage levels in the source and destination regions. Borjas
6The initial goal of the guestworker recruitment system was to have these migrants work in Germany
for a limited number of years and replace them with new ones once their permit expired. While many of
the migrants in fact went back, some stayed. Paine (1974) reports that, in practice, if these guestworkers
maintained their employment status in Germany for a few years, they were able to stay.
5(1994) explains return migration as a part of optimal life-cycle location decisions. At the
time they immigrate, migrants realize that after they acquire physical or human capital in
the host country, it may be optimal for them to return because the returns to that type of
capital are higher in the home country. The savings that immigrants accumulate in the host
country have higher purchasing power in their home country due to the lower prices there.
Djajic (1989), Dustmann (1997), and Stark et al. (1997) use this fact as a motivation for
return migration. There is empirical evidence on the savings accumulation motive as well;
e.g., Yang (2006) reports that return decision of migrants from the Philippines depends on
the exchange rate with the host countries. Higher returns in the home country to the human
capital acquired in the host country could also rationalize the return migration decision.
Another reason for return migration, used by Hill (1987) and Djajic and Milbourne (1988),
is that migrants have a preference for location. Return migration may also be the result of
unexpected events, either in the host or home country (see, e.g., Berninghaus and Siefer-
Vogt, 1992; Tunalı, 2000). Even when it is optimal to immigrate ex-ante, it may be optimal
to return after the realization of negative shocks in the host country.
The ﬁndings of the empirical literature on immigrants in Germany suggest a saving ac-
cumulation motive where migration decisions are induced by the higher purchasing power of
savings accumulated in Germany. Kırdar (2009) conﬁrms the saving accumulation conjec-
t u r ef o rt h es a m eg r o u po fi m m i g r a n t su s e di nt h i ss t u d yu s i n gt h ev a r i a t i o ni np u r c h a s i n g
power parity between the source countries and Germany. In addition, based on a survey
of emigrants from Germany in Turkey, Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) report that only
6 percent worked as salaried workers after return whereas 51 percent of the returners were
self-employed and the other 43 percent were retired, which also suggest a savings motive in
immigration to Germany. Similarly, McLean Petras and Kousis (1986) report very limited
opportunities in the labor market in Greece for return migrants from Germany. We would
expect high saving rates in the host country when the goal of immigration is to accumu-
late savings. In fact, Kumcu (1989) ﬁnds evidence for very high saving rates for Turkish
households in Germany. Accordingly, in this paper return migration is rationalized by the
higher purchasing power of accumulated savings in the home country. In addition, migrants’
preference to live in their home country and unexpected events, in the stochastic nature of
the model, also in part explain the return migration decision in the model.
62.3 Relevant Literature on the Fiscal Impact of Immigration
The literature on the ﬁscal impact of immigrants has largely focused on whether this impact,
in net present value terms, is positive and whether it can make a diﬀerence in the ﬁscal
imbalance. In this literature, the ﬁndings for diﬀerent countries vary considerably.
T h el i t e r a t u r eo nt h eU . S .r e p o r t sap o s i t i v en e tﬁscal impact of immigration over the
life-cycle and generations, but also notes that this impact would do little to change the ﬁscal
imbalance (see, e.g., Auerbach and Oreopoulos, 1999; Lee and Miller, 2000). Storesletten
(2000), using a dynamic general equilibrium model, also ﬁnds a small ﬁscal impact of current
immigration; however, he claims that it would be possible to sustain the current U.S. ﬁscal
structure by selective immigration.
The evidence from European countries is more mixed. Using the generational accounting
framework of Auerbach et al. (1991), Dolores-Collado et al. (2004) for Spain and Mayr (2005)
for Austria ﬁnd a positive ﬁscal impact of immigrants. On the other hand, Schou (2006) ﬁnds
that increased immigration would worsen the ﬁscal balance in Denmark. Storesletten (2003)
reports that net contributions of existing immigrants in Sweden are negative; however, he
also notes that net contributions of younger immigrants are positive.
Studies regarding the ﬁscal impact of immigrants in Germany generally point out to a
positive net impact, which is in accordance with my ﬁndings, as well as potentially important
contributions to the ﬁscal imbalance. For instance, Bönin et al. (2000), using a generational
accounting exercise, ﬁnd that immigrants have a positive ﬁscal impact in Germany, especially
those who arrive at younger ages. Börsch-Supan (1994) ﬁnds that immigration at historical
levels (300,000 persons per year) makes an important contribution to keeping the public
pension system stable. In fact, it reduces the increase that would happen otherwise in the
contribution rates to the various social security systems by about 50 percent.
Unlike the above studies, the focus of this paper is on how the ﬁscal impact of immigrants
changes when we account for endogenized return migration. The other key diﬀerence of
this paper is its empirical content. The ﬁndings of this paper are based on parameters
obtained from a simulated maximum likelihood estimation of a structural model using a rich
longitudinal micro level data set, rather than on calibrated parameters. While my study
ignores the descendent of immigrants unlike the above studies, it allows for a richer level of
heterogeneity in terms of observed characteristics like country of origin and age at arrival
as well as permanent unobserved characteristics on labor market ability and preferences. In
fact, no study to my knowledge accounts for the variation in net contributions by country of
7origin despite the fact that many empirical studies note important diﬀerences in the return
migration behavior across country of origin groups.7
3M o d e l
3.1 Basic Structure
The basic structure is the discrete choice dynamic programming approach, as outlined in
Eckstein and Wolpin (1989). Immigrants choose among a ﬁnite set of mutually exclusive
alternatives over a ﬁnite horizon. The elements of the choice set at each time period are
return migration and saving decisions. Immigrants make these decisions under uncertainty:
there are random shocks to earnings and preferences, and labor market status follows a
stochastic exogenous process. Each period, immigrants realize their labor market status and
earnings and decide ﬁrst whether to stay in Germany or go back to their home country. If
they choose to stay, they also make a decision about how much to save.
I model the decisions of male household heads. The model incorporates both observed
and unobserved heterogeneity in these immigrants’ characteristics. To handle unobserved
heterogeneity, I assume that there is a ﬁnite number of types of immigrants according to their
various permanent unobserved characteristics like preferences and labor market ability, and
immigrants within the same type group share the same unobserved heterogeneity. Permanent
observed characteristics of immigrants in the model are country of origin and age at arrival,
and time-varying observed characteristics include accumulated savings, labor market status,
a n dd u r a t i o no fr e s i d e n c ei nG e r m a n y .
The decision spell starts when an immigrant arrives in Germany and goes until he dies or
returns to his home country. Each decision period is taken to be two-years long. Mortality
is deterministic and varies according to the country of origin.
3.1.1 Preferences in Germany
Immigrants have preferences over consumption (ct) and location of residence. The utility
function, given in (1), has an augmented CRRA form, where 1−λ is the constant relative risk
aversion parameter. The marginal utility of consumption (µ) varies by age and permanent
7See, e.g., Kırdar (2009), Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) and Lam (1994) for immigrants in Germany, the
U.S., and Canada, respectively.
8unobserved preference characteristics (type). ρ(.) stands for immigrants’ psychic cost of
living in Germany. This is the diﬀerence between the psychic utility in Germany and that in
t h eh o s tc o u n t r y .I m m i g r a n t s ’p s y c h i cc o s tv a r i e sb yt h e i rd u r a t i o no fr e s i d e n c ei nG e r m a n y
(t),a g ea te n t r y(age0) and type. ηs









There are three constraints, as shown in (2). (i) Given their labor income (ynet






, and asset income (rAt), immigrants make their consumption and saving
decisions. At denotes asset holdings at period t and r is the interest rate. (ii) There is a
minimum consumption level, cmin, which is an institutional feature in this model because this
consumption level is guaranteed by the German government through its social assistance for
subsistence income program. I allow this subsistence income, which depends on family size,
to vary by age and nationality (z). (iii) Borrowing is not allowed.8




t + rAt, (ii) ct ≥ cmin(aget,z), (iii) At ≥ 0 (2)
3.1.3 Labor Market Status in Germany
There are three potential paths to retirement in Germany: old-age retirement schemes after
age 60, disability, and pre-retirement. Old-age retirement is, in turn, possible through four
diﬀerent paths for male workers: 1) One can retire after age 65. 2) Retirement is also possible
at age 63 conditional on having a long service life, which is 35 years. 3) Conditional on a
qualifying period of at least 15 years, workers who have been unemployed for 52 weeks can
retire at age 60. 4) Retirement after age 60 is possible for disabled workers.9 Retirement
before age 60 is also possible through disability as well as pre-retirement of workers receiving
unemployment compensation.
I assume that all immigrants (male household heads) who are not retired are willing
to work. Therefore, at each period, immigrants who are not retired are either employed
8Immigrants are there to save.
9I assume that this structure is unchanged during the life-cycle of an immigrant and that immigrants
expect no change. In fact, there was an upward adjustment in the retirement age with a reform passed in
1992. However, Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2004) report that this reform will be completely in eﬀect only in
2017; therefore, it would not aﬀect most of the workers in my sample.
9or unemployed. Retirement is an absorbing state. Labor market status is modeled using
a multinomial logit that depends on the labor market status in the previous period, age,
age-at-entry to Germany, nationality, and permanent labor market characteristics; thus,
lt = L(lt−1,age t,age 0,z,type) (3)
3.1.4 Labor Income in Germany
Gross labor income of an immigrant at period t, yt, depends on how much human capital he
has acquired, Ht, on the rental price of human capital, p, as well as a random productivity
shock, η
y
t. The level of human capital at any period depends on the years of residence, age
at entry, nationality and permanent skill characteristics of the immigrant; thus,
yt = pHt exp(η
y
t), where Ht = H(t,age0,z,type) (4)
Three types of social security contributions — pension, unemployment, and health — are
paid out of gross labor income. Income taxes, calculated according to the progressive income
tax schedule in Germany, are also deducted to ﬁnd the net labor income, ynet
t . The details
of social security contributions and income taxes are provided in Appendix A.
3.1.5 Transfer Income in Germany
Transfer income, yT
t , includes unemployment beneﬁts, unemployment assistance, pension in-
come, and social assistance for subsistence income. The institutional details of these transfer
programs are duely incorporated into the model with a number of simpliﬁcations made for
the tractability of the model. Only the main features are given here and the details as well
as the way these details are taken to model are left to Appendix A.
In Germany, workers who were employed for at least 360 days in the last three years qual-
ify to receive unemployment beneﬁts. This implies that a period of employment in the model,
which lasts two years, results in qualiﬁcation in the consecutive period. Unemployment ben-
eﬁts are equal to two thirds of net employment earnings. Once their entitlement period
ends, unemployed workers can still receive another type of beneﬁt, called unemployment
assistance, which is about 15 percent less than unemployment beneﬁts. There is no limit on
the entitlement duration of unemployment assistance; however, unemployment assistance is
means-tested according to asset income. Both unemployment beneﬁts and assistance are net
earnings and, therefore, neither social security nor income taxes are applicable.
10German pension insurance system is mandatory to all workers except for the self-employed
and those with very low incomes. I assume that these two groups, which constitute a small
fraction of the immigrant population, choose to enroll in the PI system. The minimum con-
tribution period to qualify for pension beneﬁts is ﬁve years and periods of unemployment
are included in the pension contribution period. Since all immigrants are willing to work
in the model, the contribution period is equal to the duration of residence in the model.
All diﬀerent paths to retirement eﬀectively pay the same level of beneﬁt. Pension beneﬁts
depend on the earnings history and are proportional to the contribution period.10 Workers’
history of labor market earnings is averaged to generate their relative contribution position.
Their contribution period determines the replacement rate applied to the relative contribu-
tion position; e.g., for a worker with a 45-year earnings history and average lifetime earnings,
pension beneﬁts are equal to 72 percent of his average net earnings while employed.
Workers receive social assistance if their income is not high enough to provide for their
basic needs. If the sum of labor and transfer income and asset ﬂows falls below the subsistence
income level, the government makes up for the diﬀerence.
3.1.6 Preferences in the Home Country
Once an immigrant returns to his home country, he exits the sample. As a result, I have no
information on his labor market status, income, or saving decisions after return. Therefore,
the utility an immigrant receives from spending his remaining lifetime in his home country,
V L(e St), is written as a deterministic function of a subset of the state variables at the time of
return. These state variables include assets interacted with purchasing power parity (pppAt),
age, duration of residence and nationality, as shown in (5). This function is explained in




3.2 The Problem in Recursive Formulation
Immigrants maximize the present discounted value of their remaining lifetime utility from
the age of arrival until they return to their home country or die. The age of mortality
is taken as 70 for Turkish, 72 for ex-Yugoslavian and 76 for Italian, Greek and Spanish
10There are also two other adjustment factors: one for the pension type and one for the average pension
level, which determines the income distribution between pensioners and the working population.
11immigrants in accordance with the life expectancy of males in these countries calculated for
the birth-cohorts in the sample.11 The corresponding age of mortality for Germans is 74.12
In the case that an immigrant chooses to stay in Germany, he makes a saving decision,
∆At = At+1 − At, which is discretized into K distinct levels.13 In the objective function
g i v e ni n( 6 ) ,dk
τ =1if the saving alternative k is chosen at period τ and dk
τ =0otherwise.
E is the expectations operator, T is the last period in the life-cycle, and δ is the discount
factor (which varies by type), and St is the state space at time t. State variables include
accumulated savings, labor market status, country of origin, age at arrival, type, and the
contemporaneous shocks, the ηt’s. I assume that ηt’s are jointly serially independent.
V
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The solution to the problem in (6) is given by a decision rule that takes the points of
the state space to the optimal saving choice. The immigrant compares the maximal value of
this problem, V S
t (St), with the deterministic value of returning to the home country, V L
t (e St),
and makes his return decision accordingly. This optimization problem can be recast in the
following dynamic programming form.
11For a given birth cohort, total life expectancy increases by age. Moreover, due to the improvement in
health conditions over time, life expectancy proﬁles over age are at a higher level for later birth cohorts.
Because of these reasons, I employ an averaging strategy over the birth cohorts in the sample and over age
by taking the life expectancies at age 45 for the 1940 birth cohort according to the data provided in the
European Health Statistics of the World Health Organization.
12Although Razum et al. (1998) ﬁnd a lower mortality rate for Turkish residents in Germany than
Germans (on contrary to my assumption), they only consider immigrants residing in Germany whereas I
am interested in the life-expectancy of all immigrants who ever entered Germany. In fact, they admit that
their ﬁnding could be resulting from an ’unhealthy re-migration eﬀect’. Moreover, Kibele et al. (2008) point
out a methodological problem in this study, which is based on population registries, in the way that they
underreport deaths among immigrants because the deaths of immigrants who are resident in Germany but
die in their home countries may not be included in the registries. Kibele et al. (2008) use the German Pension
Scheme data set, which follows all pensioners very accurately and therefore does not suﬀer from this problem,
and ﬁnd that the life expectancy of Germans is slightly higher than that of immigrants. Although this ﬁnding
is more in line with my assumption, their estimate would not give the life-expectancy of all immigrants who
ever entered Germany, either, because even though they include immigrants who are resident in Germany
but temporarily abroad, they still exclude pensioners with current residence abroad.
13These discrete levels of savings are ±(6,000, 12,000, 24,000) and 0, +18,000, +36,000 and +48,000.
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The expectation in (8) is taken over the joint distribution of the stochastic shocks to
earnings and preferences and over the labor market states. In the last period of the problem,
the continuation value is a bequest function that depends on the level of assets and type:
VT+1(ST+1)=B(AT+1,type). (This function does not introduce any new parameters. As
explained in Appendix B, all of its parameters are already included in the value of the
returning to home country, V L(e St).)
The solution of this problem is not analytic and a numerical backward solution algorithm
is used. This solution involves the calculation of EtVt+1(St+1), which requires the calculation
of multi-dimensional integrals due to the number of stochastic elements in the model. This
is done using Monte-Carlo integration over the joint distribution of shocks at all possible
points of the state space for all periods. Since the number of the state space points at which
the problem needs to be solved depends on the decision horizon, I take the decision period
as two years to alleviate the computational burden.
4D a t a
The data set used in this study is the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). This is
a longitudinal data set of households in Germany that contains an oversampled group of
immigrants from ﬁve Mediterranean countries, of which three are members of the European
Union (Greece, Italy and Spain) and two are not (Turkey and Ex-Yugoslavia). I use the
2000 version of the GSOEP, which is conducted annually from 1984 to 2000. It is important
to note that this is not a random sample of immigrants from these ﬁve source countries who
enter Germany but rather a stock-sample of them in 1984 with follow-up. The initial sample
in 1984 contains 1326 households.
I analyze the behavior of male immigrants who made the choice to immigrate to Ger-
many. Therefore, I restrict the sample to households with a ﬁrst-generation immigrant male.
A ﬁrst-generation immigrant is deﬁned as one who entered Germany after the age of 18.
1055 households have a ﬁrst-generation male household head. In addition, nine households
have a ﬁrst-generation male whose family status is registered as a spouse. Deﬁning these
13nine males as household heads, I end up with 1064 households with a ﬁrst-generation male
household head. Two of these who entered Germany after the age of ﬁfty are dropped. Con-
sequently, the ﬁnal sample contains 1062 male ﬁrst-generation household heads, of which 312
are Turkish, 234 are ex-Yugoslavian, 156 are Greek, 212 are Italian, and 148 are Spanish.14
The surveys on these household heads contain detailed information on return migra-
tion, saving, labor market status and income. Return migration is reported as "moved out
of country" in the sample by information gathered from other family members, relatives,
neighbors, and so forth. Saving information is available only after 1991. Immigrants are
asked about their average monthly saving. However, the data are censored below at zero
because respondents are not asked about their dissaving.15 I n f o r m a t i o no ni m m i g r a n t s ’l a b o r
market status is available from their year of entry to Germany whereas income information
is available after 1983, including amounts for each type of income. In accordance with the
sources of income in the model, I use labor income, unemployment beneﬁts and assistance,
pension beneﬁts, subsistence income, and asset ﬂows components. All income data are re-
ported in 1998 prices. All four pieces of information—return migration, saving, labor market
status, and income—are aggregated to two-year intervals in accordance with the solution of
the dynamic model.
Macro data are also used in the estimation. These are the purchasing power parity (ppp)
between the source countries and Germany and expected wages in the source countries. In
calculating the expected wages, unemployment rates and the replacement rates of unem-
ployment beneﬁts in the source countries are taken into consideration. Since there is no
calendar year in the model, averages of time series data from 1975 to 2000, are taken. The
macro data, displayed in Table 1, show that both ppp and expected wages display signiﬁcant
variation across the source countries; e.g., compared to that in Germany, purchasing power
is 120 percent higher in Turkey whereas it is only 30 percent higher in Italy.
14In addition, there are 28 other ﬁrst-generation males who enter the sample later, after 1984, mostly
through marriages to the initial members of the sample. However, since this group is selected into the
sample through their higher propensity to marry, I exclude this group.
15GSOEP has also information on remittances and how much of these remittances are used for saving
purposes. The assumption I make in calculating saving data is that if an immigrant make remittances in the
form of savings, he also includes this amount when he answers the question on his average monthly saving.
In fact, both the GSOEP data and a study by Koç and Onan (2004), using data from Turkey, show that
most of the remittances are used for consumption purposes.
144.1 Descriptive Statistics
4.1.1 Immigrant Characteristics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the immigrant population from the ﬁve countries
in the sample in 1984. Almost two thirds of this population are non-EU immigrants: Turks
constitute 42.2 percent and ex-Yugoslavians 23.3 percent of this population. The population
shares of EU source countries are smaller: 9.2 percent for Greece, 19.8 percent for Italy, and
5.6 percent for Spain. Immigrants in this population were relatively young at arrival: the
mean age at arrival is 27.4 years. Age at arrival is quite similar across nationalities, except
for Italian immigrants whose average age at arrival is lower at 25. The average year of
immigration is close to 1970; i.e., in the initial wave of the survey in 1984, these immigrants
had been in Germany on average for 14 years. Yet, for all nationalities there are immigrants
who arrived in the early 1980’s, whose outcomes we can observe starting from early years
of residence. However, due to their smaller number the data are sparser at early years of
residence, except for labor market outcomes which include retrospective information. The
mean value for the duration of residence until the last survey is almost 23 years, which
implies that the mean value for the year of last survey is roughly 1993.
4.1.2 Labor Market Outcomes, Income, and Saving Choices
Here, I present immigrants’ labor market outcomes, income, and saving choices over their
duration of residence in Germany. The ﬁgures in this section are going to be used in validating
the model. In these ﬁgures, an immigrant can show up many times as long as he does not
return; therefore, the ﬁgures are inﬂuenced by the eﬀects of return migration dynamics.
The ﬁrst panel of Figure 1 illustrates the percent unemployed immigrants over duration of
residence by EU status. For both EU groups, the percentage of unemployed immigrants rises
remarkably by duration of residence. The upward proﬁle is much more prominent for non-EU
immigrants, though: at 30 years of residence while the unemployment rate of EU immigrants
is around 10 percent, it is almost 30 percent for non-EU immigrants. The fraction of retired
immigrants by duration of residence and EU status is displayed in the second panel of Figure
1. More than 20 percent of non-EU immigrants and more than 10 percent of EU immigrants
are already retired before age 60. The fraction of retired immigrants rises substantially at
age 60 and after age 65 in accordance with the rules of the German retirement system.
The ﬁrst panel of Figure 2 presents the income proﬁles over duration of residence by EU
15s t a t u s .T h ei n c o m ep r o ﬁles are rather ﬂat for both EU groups. Per period income levels are
slightly higher for EU immigrants: while they lie roughly between sixty and seventy thou-
sand DM for non-EU immigrants, for EU immigrants they average around seventy thousand
DM except for the very early and late periods. (One DM was roughly equal to 0.6 U.S.
dollar at the end of 1998.) The fact that immigrants’ income levels are relatively constant
over time despite steadily rising unemployment rates seems to be surprising. However, as
unemployment rates of immigrants were rising in Germany, real wages were also increasing.
While the real wage rate in Germany was 74 percent of that in the U.S. in 1984, it was 184
percent of that in the U.S. in 1995 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). Moreover, the rise in
asset ﬂows over time—along with the rise in the accumulated assets—also in part compensate
for the decline in average income due to a higher likelihood of unemployment.
Mean saving proﬁles by EU status are illustrated in the second panel of Figure 2.16 The
most salient feature of the ﬁgure is the diﬀerence in the shape of the proﬁles according to
EU status. The saving ﬂow of non-EU immigrants goes down from a level well above 10,000
DM in the 5th period to a level below 5,000 DM after the 15th period. On the other hand,
the saving proﬁle of EU immigrants is relatively ﬂat at a level just below 10,000 DM until
the few last periods.
4.1.3 Return Migration Choices
The Kaplan-Meier hazard function for return migration choices, which is also going to be used
in the validation of the model, is estimated by duely addressing the stock-sample structure
of the data. Since the sample represents the immigrant population from ﬁve countries in
Germany in 1984, it is more likely to include immigrants with longer spells of residence
in Germany. Therefore, I use the standard techniques in duration analysis to handle left-
t r u n c a t i o n — t h e r ei sl a t ee n t r yi n t ot h er i s ks e tb u tw ek n o wt h et i m ea tw h i c ht h ee n t r yt ot h e
risk set takes place—in generating the hazard functions. This technique handles the ’selection
bias’ resulting from the higher likelihood of inclusion of immigrants with longer spells of
residence by using the information on the elapsed time between the year of immigration
and the year of ﬁrst interview. According to this, for instance, an immigrant who arrives in
Germany in 1974 enters the risk set at 10 years of residence and contributes to the hazard
function after this time whereas an immigrant who arrives in Germany in 1964 enters the
risk set at 20 years of residence. This implies that when I compute the Kaplan-Meier hazard
16Since the saving data is available only after 1991, the earliest saving observation is at the ﬁfth period.
16functions, I assume that there are no direct year-of-arrival eﬀects; i.e., holding all other
characteristics constant two immigrants who arrive in Germany in two diﬀerent years would
display the same return migration behavior.17
The smoothed Kaplan-Meier hazard contributions according to EU status, presented in
Figure 3, reveal signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the EU groups.18 In fact, a statistical test of
the equality of the survivor functions is rejected: EU immigrants are more likely to return.
There are important diﬀerences in the timing of return as well. EU immigrants are much
more likely to return at earlier periods. Their hazard function exhibits a precipitous decline
in the ﬁrst ﬁv ep e r i o d s ,a f t e rt h a ti ti sr e l a t i v e l yﬂat at a six percent level until late periods
when it slightly increases again as immigrants reach retirement age. On the other hand,
non-EU immigrants’ hazard function has a hump shape that peaks at around the 7th to 8th
periods (15 years of residence) at a level of ﬁve and a half percent per period.
5 Estimation Method
One of the endogenous state variables in the model, accumulated savings, is not observed.
Therefore, I use the method introduced by Keane and Wolpin (2001) for estimating dynamic
panel data models with unobserved endogenous state variables. Typically, the calculation
of the probabilities that form the likelihood function requires conditioning on past state
variables (see, e.g., Keane and Wolpin, 1997). The novel feature of this method is that
it removes the need to calculate these conditional probabilities. The basic idea of this
estimation method is to minimize the distance between the simulated and reported outcomes.
A measure of the distance between the simulated and reported outcomes is constructed by
assuming that the observed outcomes are measured with error.19 By acknowledging the
existence of measurement errors for the continuous outcomes and classiﬁcation errors for
the discrete ones, I incorporate into the likelihood calculation, for instance, the fact that
when a migrant is observed as employed, there is a positive probability that he was in fact
17In fact, a test of equality of the survivor functions according to year of arrival is not rejected. This test
is done under stratiﬁcation according to country of origin because of the variation in the country of origin
composition of year-of-entry groups.
18This is based on a weighted kernel smooth of estimated hazard contributions. A relatively narrow
bandwidth is chosen in order not to smooth to much.
19Keane and Sauer (2003) show that this estimator has good small sample properties in a more extended
setting.
17unemployed but his employment status was classiﬁed incorrectly in the data.
Following Heckman and Singer’s (1984) non-parametric modeling of unobserved hetero-
geneity, I assume that there is a ﬁnite number (K) of type groups. Each individual i may
belong to any of these type groups, 1 to K. It is the probability of being a certain type
that diﬀers across individuals. Therefore, when I generate the simulated outcomes for an
individual, I do it separately for each type. Using the initial state variables and the se-
quence of random shocks drawn for each individual, I simulate N/K migration and saving
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n=1 , for each type of each individual. In the construction
of these simulated histories, the initial value of accumulated savings is taken as zero and
l a b o rm a r k e ts t a t u sb e f o r ea r r i v a li st a k e na s" e m p l o y e d " . 20
The part inside the parenthesis in (9) gives the simulator for type k of individual i, which
is the probability of observing the reported outcomes, Oobs
i =( Dobs
i ,Xobs
i ), conditional on the
simulated outcomes averaged over the N/K simulated histories. This simulator is conditional
on staying in Germany until 1984 because the sample contains only immigrants who stayed
in Germany until 1984. In equation (9), I({mint}
ti,1983
t=1 =0 )indicates that the migration
choice from the ﬁrst period in Germany until the period in 1983 for individual i was to stay.
Then, the likelihood contribution for this individual, b P(Oobs
i ),i sc a l c u l a t e da st h ew e i g h t e d
average of these simulators for each type over the probabilities of his belonging to each type,
which is shown by κi,k in (9). κi,k is speciﬁed as a multinomial logit with age at entry and
country of origin as arguments: κk = κ(age0,z). Appendix C presents the details of the
estimation method, including the deﬁnitions of classiﬁcation and measurement errors and
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20The former assumption, I believe, is a parsimonious one as most of these immigrants were unskilled young
people from poor regions that chose to work in a foreign country. Since employment transition is a ﬁrst-order
Markov chain and most immigrants were employed in their ﬁrst period in Germany, the assumption that
everybody was employed before entry would have very little impact on the results.
186 Estimation Results
6.1 Parameter Estimates and Interpretation of Types
The estimated parameters and their standard errors are presented in Appendix D. All
parameter estimates are sensible and have the expected signs; e.g., the marginal utility
of consumption is lower at early and later ages—when family size is smaller—, psychic cost
decreases over time and increases in age at arrival, and country of origin parameters are in
line with the general attractiveness of these countries—the highest for Italy and lowest for
ex-Yugoslavia. I am not interested in the estimated value of any parameter per se; however,
here I will discuss one interesting ﬁnding regarding the coeﬃcient of CRRA utility function.
The estimated coeﬃcient of the CRRA utility function is 0.63; i.e., the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion is 0.37, which is low compared to what the literature has generally
uncovered so far. For instance, Gooree et al. (2003) report a number of experimental studies
that estimate a risk aversion parameter that is around 0.5. My estimate implies a high level
of willingness to substitute consumption intertemporally and a low level of relative prudence.
Normally a high level of prudence is required so that young people do not borrow despite
a rising lifetime income proﬁle. However, with borrowing constraints—which are included in
my model—a high level of prudence may not be needed anymore. In fact, Keane and Wolpin
(2001), also ﬁnd a low coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion in their model, which also accounts
for borrowing constraints. My estimation results indicate that these immigrants are willing
to save a lot and endure relatively low levels of consumption after their arrival to Germany to
take advantage of the higher purchasing power of their accumulated savings after returning
to their home country. This behavior is more likely to come from people with a high level
of willingness to substitute consumption intertemporally.
In a migration model, it is quite important to understand the diﬀerences across immigrant
types because the distribution of types changes over time due to the diﬀerences in their
return migration behavior. I assumed that immigrants diﬀer in terms of their unobserved
permanent characteristics with respect to their psychic costs of living in Germany, discount
factor, marginal utility of consumption, labor market ability, and the way the value of
returning to their home country varies with respect to their accumulated savings. Due to
the variation in these characteristics, diﬀerent types display quite diﬀerent return migration
behavior. Figure 4 displays the hazard functions for all immigrants by type. While type 3s
a r es t a y e r s ,t y p e1 s ,2 s ,a n d4 sc a nb ec l a s s i ﬁed as returners. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences exist
19in the return behavior of these returner types as well. Type 4s have the highest the hazard
rates and their hazard function is rather ﬂat over time. While both type 1s and type 2s
have upward sloping hazard functions, the hazard function of type 2s rises earlier. Another
important distinguishing feature across types is their unemployment rates. Type 4s have
much higher unemployment rates than the rest of the types. In addition, unemployment
r a t e so ft y p e1 sa r el o w e rt h a nt h o s eo ft y p e2 sa n d3 s .
Table 3 lists the proportion of each type by nationality over duration of residence. At the
time of their arrival to Germany, there is a higher fraction of type 1s and type 4s among EU
immigrants whereas the fraction of type 2s and type 3s are higher for non-EU immigrants.
As can also be seen from the table, the fraction of type 4s in the immigrant pool decreases
quickly over time due to their high hazard rates. On the contrary, the fraction of type 3s
increases over time. The change in the fractions of type 1s and 2s over time is non-monotonic:
their fractions at ﬁrst increase, then decrease.
This change in the proportion of types over time explains how we can reconcile the
increasing hazard functions by type in Figure 4 with the actual hazard functions in Figure
3, where hazard rates exhibit substantial declining periods. As the returner types (types 1,
2, and 4) leave Germany for their home countries, the fraction of the stayer type (type 3)
in the immigrant population increases. As a result, the aggregate hazard rate falls despite
increasing hazard rates over time by type.
6.2 Model Fit
Here, I illustrate and discuss how the model’s predictions as to the return migration and
saving choices as well as the exogenous transitions compare to the corresponding values in
the data. Chi-squared test statistics are also provided to assess the goodness of ﬁt. Overall,
the model does quite well in accounting for these features in the data.
Figure 5 compares the actual and predicted hazard functions according to EU status. The
m o d e ld o e sav e r yg o o dj o bi nc a p t u r i n gb o t ht h el e v e la n dt i m i n go fr e t u r nm i g r a t i o nf o r
both EU groups despite the marked diﬀerences between them. The model’s predictions for
non-EU immigrants in the few early periods are somewhat above the actual values; however,
this is due to sparsity of data in these periods. Further evidence for the model ﬁt of hazard
rates is given Table 4, where actual and predicted hazard rates by duration of residence and
EU status as well as chi-squared test statistics for goodness of ﬁt are provided. The equality
of actual and predicted values is not rejected, at the ﬁve percent signiﬁcant level, except for
20only one period out of eighteen periods for each EU group.
Figure 6 displays how the predicted saving proﬁle compares to the actual saving proﬁle
by EU status. For non-EU immigrants, the model captures the downward sloping saving
proﬁle as well as the level of saving very well. The only exceptions are the ﬁrst and last
few periods where the observations are fewer. The model also predicts the ﬂat shape of
the saving proﬁle of EU immigrants around 9,000 DM very well. Moreover, it captures the
decline toward the last few periods.
Next, I present evidence on model ﬁt for the exogenous covariates. Figure 7 illustrates
the ﬁt for mean income proﬁle according to EU status. For both groups, the model predicts
t h el e v e la n ds h a p eo ft h ei n c o m ep r o ﬁle very well. Table 5 displays the actual and predicted
values of unemployment rate by duration of residence and EU status as well as chi-squared
tests for goodness of ﬁt. For both EU groups, the predictions match the data reasonably
well. The equality of actual and predicted values can not be rejected, at the ﬁve percent
statistical signiﬁcance level, except for three periods for non-EU immigrants and two periods
for EU immigrants out of nineteen periods for each. The model ﬁt for the fraction of retired
workers by age and EU status along with chi-squared tests for goodness of ﬁta r es h o w ni n
T a b l e6 .T h em o d e ld o e sav e r yg o o dj o bi nc a p t u r i n gt h ef r a c t i o no fr e t i r e dw o r k e r sb ya g e
for both EU groups. Chi-squared tests for the equality of actual and predicted values are
n o tr e j e c t e da tt h eﬁve percent statistical signiﬁcance level at any period.
6.3 Out-of-Sample Validation
6.3.1 Replicating the 1983 Policy for Encouraging Return
I compare the results of the 1983 policy of cash bonuses conditional on return implemented
by the German government with the predicted results of enforcing this policy in my model.
According to this policy, 10,500 DM was given to unemployed workers conditional on re-
turn, along with an additional 1,500 DM for each child. It is not possible to estimate the
actual impact of this policy by examining the rise in the total number of returners during
the policy years over the previous ones because another policy was implemented simultane-
ously, in which immigrants could take back their own contributions (but not the employers’
contributions) to the PI system conditional on return.
A c c o r d i n gt oa no ﬃcial report of the German Federal Employment Agency (1985), who
oversaw the bonus policy, 38,000 total family members returned by January 1985 using this
21policy. This report also states that 90 percent of these returners were Turks, putting the
number of Turks returning as a result of this policy approximately at 34,000. The German
Federal Statistics Oﬃce reports that 155,336 Turks returned in 1979-80 and 143,059 Turks
returned in 1981-82. Assuming that roughly 150,000 Turks would also return in the 1983-84
period in the absence of the policy and that 34,000 Turks who returned using the bonus
policy would not have returned in these years at the absence of the policy imply that the
policy increased the hazard rate of Turkish immigrants by about 22.7 percent in this period.
However, this mark at 22.7 percent is certainly an upper bound because some of these 34,000
immigrants would certainly return in these years even in the absence of the policy.
Next, I examine the impact of this policy in my model. First, I ﬁnd the eﬀect of the policy
at all values of duration of residence; then, I weight these eﬀects according to the duration
of residence distribution of Turks in Germany in 1984. When I give Turkish immigrants a
16,000 DM bonus (12,000 DM in 1984 prices) assuming one child per immigrant, I calculate
the impact of the policy on the hazard rate as 14.3 percent. When I estimate the impact
with a 18,000 DM bonus assuming two children per immigrant, the resulting change is 16.8
percent. Given that the upper bound for the actual impact is about 22.7 percent, the model
provides a reasonable match to the actual impact of the policy.
6.3.2 Other External Validation
I was not able to validate the saving predictions of my model in the ﬁrst ﬁve periods as there
is no saving information in GSOEP for these periods. Paine (1974), based on a report by
the State Planning Organization of Turkey in 1971—when all Turkish guestworkers would be
in Germany for less then ten years and most for less than four years—, reports a saving rate
of 36 percent. Based on a study conducted by the Central Bank of Turkey in 1986, which
gathered saving and income information according to immigrants’ duration of residence, I
calculate that the saving rate of Turkish immigrants with less than four years of residence
was 39 percent. The model predicts a saving rate of 36.7 percent in the ﬁrst two years
of residence and a 32.1 percent saving rate during the subsequent two years for Turkish
immigrants. Therefore, the model can account for the high saving rate in the early years
after arrival, for at least one immigrant group by country of origin.
As shown in Section 6.1, unobserved heterogeneity plays an important role in explaining
the observed return migration behavior. A key feature of the distribution of unobserved types
was that EU immigrants include a much larger share of type 4s, who have lower labor market
22ability. Referring to German government sources, Paine (1974, p.82) reports that in 1968—
when most immigrants would be relatively recent arrivals— the proportion of skilled workers
among Turkish immigrants was higher than that for other labor exporting countries except
for Yugoslavia. Moreover, she adds that the proportion of skilled among the new Turkish
migrants arriving after 1968 was also higher than that for other Mediterranean emigration
countries. Paine (1974, p.79) also draws attention to the low illiteracy rate among Turkish
and Yugoslavian immigrants compared to other nationalities. These facts are consistent
with my ﬁnding that Turkish and ex-Yugoslavian immigrants contain a much smaller share
of immigrant type with lower labor market ability.
7 The Impact of Immigrants on the German Pension
Insurance and Unemployment Insurance Systems
In this section, I examine the net gains of the German PI and UI systems from immigrants
and how return migration inﬂuences them. Both PI and UI taxes are levied equally on
employees and employers. The total contribution rate of employers and employees as a
fraction of employees’ gross earnings is 18.7 percent to the PI system and 4.3 percent to
the UI system, except for very high gross earnings. (The details on workers’ contributions
can be seen in Appendix A.) Immigrants can receive their pension beneﬁts even after they
return to their home countries. Immigrants who qualify for pension beneﬁts but return
before retirement start drawing their beneﬁts at the regular retirement age of 65. Those who
return before the minimum qualiﬁcation period for pension beneﬁts, it is assumed, take back
their own contributions only when they return.
7.1 Pension Insurance
The discounted value of net PI contributions of immigrants—including employers’ share—at













(1 + r)s (10)
In (10), c is the total contribution rate of employers and employees, yp is pension income,
tret is period of retirement. The ﬁrst term in (10) stands for the contributions, the second
term for the receipts of beneﬁts, and the last term for survivor beneﬁts. In Germany,
23survivors receive 60 percent of the beneﬁts of their spouses. In accordance with the life
expectancies of immigrants from the ﬁve source countries in the sample, I take the life
expectancy of females as ﬁve years longer than that of males.
The ﬁrst panel of Figure 8 displays the present value at arrival of the net lifetime contribu-
tions of immigrants to the PI system by country of origin and age at entry. PI contributions
are positive regardless of age-at-entry and country of origin and quantitatively signiﬁcant
for many groups. Net contributions are higher for early arrivers, especially for non-EU im-
migrants. For instance, the value of net lifetime contributions of a Turkish immigrant who
enters at the age of 18 is 95,076 DM, and that for an ex-Yugoslavian immigrant who enters
at the same age is 121,521 DM (1998 prices). Compared to their annual earnings at arrival,
net contributions of 18-year-old arrivers are 3.6 times as much for Turkish and 4.2 times as
much for ex-Yugoslavian immigrants. For EU immigrants, net contributions are smaller but
still important; for 18-year-old arrivers, compared to their annual earnings at arrival they are
twice as much for Greek, and 1.6 times as much for Spanish and Italian immigrants. For the
oldest arrivers, 48-year-olds, net contributions are still above 20,000 DM for all nationalities,
and little variation exists in net contributions across nationalities.
An important factor that contributes to the positive net PI contributions of immigrants
is that their average age of retirement is higher than that of natives. The average age of
retirement has been rather low in Germany due to the various early retirement possibilities.
According to Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2004), the average age of retirement has been below
sixty since 1978; it was even below ﬁfty-nine between 1980 and 1985. On the other hand,
according to my simulations, the average age of retirement is 61.6 for Turkish, 62.7 for ex-
Yugoslavian and Greek immigrants, 63.4 for Italian and Spanish immigrants. The reason to
the higher average retirement age of immigrants is that most of the immigrants who return
to their home countries can not utilize any of the early retirement schemes.
It is also important to note that a higher average retirement age for all immigrants
is possible despite earlier retirement of immigrants who stay in Germany. According to my
model, 24.3 percent of 58-year-old and 51.5 percent of 60-year-old Turks residing in Germany
receive pension beneﬁts; whereas, Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999) report, based on the
1993-95 waves of the GSOEP, that these percentages are around 20 and 45 for 58-year-old
and 60-year-old Germans, respectively. In other words, even though Turkish immigrants who
stay in Germany have higher retirement rates conditional on age, when we include those who
return to Turkey, their average age of retirement is in fact higher.
24Net contributions of non-EU immigrants are much higher because ﬁrst non-EU immi-
grants have shorter lifespans; therefore, they collect less beneﬁts. Second, since EU immi-
grants are more likely to return, in particular at earlier periods, their contribution period
is shorter. A shorter contribution period implies that when the net contribution of each
additional year of residence is positive, lifetime contributions will be lower and, in fact, net
contributions from staying one more year average positive except for the latest periods for
certain groups. (The contribution of each additional year is lower at later periods mainly
due to higher unemployment rates.) Finally, EU immigrants include a higher share of the
immigrant type with lower labor market ability (type 4) whose net contributions are lower.
These facts dominate the eﬀects of a slightly lower retirement age and slightly lower earnings
as well as higher rates of unemployment for non-EU immigrants, and their contributions are
higher than those of EU immigrants.
Net lifetime PI contributions of younger arrivers are higher for all nationalities, as can
be seen in Figure 8. Older arrivers claim beneﬁts for a shorter duration due to their higher
average retirement age. However, this fact is overwhelmed by a number of other factors that
work in the opposite direction. First, older arrivers have a shorter contribution period due
to a shorter remaining worklife. Second, since the earnings of older arrivers are lower, their
contribution levels are also lower. (Younger arrivers have both higher earnings at arrival and
a longer worklife during which their earnings increase.) Finally, since the fraction of worklife
spent as unemployed is higher for older arrivers, their net contributions are lower.
The decline in net contributions by age-at-entry is more pronounced for non-EU immi-
grants due to the diﬀerences between the EU groups in the relationship between age-at-entry
and return behavior. While older arrivers among non-EU immigrants are much more likely
to return, it is just the opposite for EU immigrants. In addition, the variation across age-
at-entry groups among non-EU immigrants is much wider. For instance, among Turkish
immigrants, 73 percent of 20-year-old entrants survive in Germany for 20 years whereas only
29 percent of 40-year-old entrants survive for the same duration. On the other hand, the
survival rates for 20 years in Germany are 34.5 percent for 20-year-old entrants and 38.4
percent for 40-year-old entrants among Italian immigrants. Since older arrivers of non-EU
immigrants have a shorter duration of residence in Germany, they make much lower net
contributions than younger arrivers.
257.2 Unemployment Insurance
Net contributions of immigrants to the UI system, which are illustrated in the second column
of Figure 8, are positive regardless of age-at-entry for all nationalities but Turks. Even
for Turks, net contributions are positive for many of the young-arriver groups. This may
be surprising, at ﬁrst, given the quite high unemployment rates of immigrants from these
countries in Germany. The key underlying fact is that high unemployment rates occur
late in the life-cycle of these immigrants. As a result, unemployment rates of immigrants
currently residing in Germany are very high. However, I calculate the net contributions of
all in-migrants to Germany; immigrants who returned made on average much higher net
contributions to the UI system because unemployment rates in the early years after arrival
were so much lower.
Wide variation exists in net UI contributions across demographic groups; e.g., those of
18-year-old Greek arrivers are 27,104 DM, which is almost equal to their annual earnings
at arrival, whereas those of 46-year-old Turkish arrivers average -3,450 DM. The variation
across country of origin groups in their net contributions reﬂects the diﬀerences in their
unemployment rates. Nonetheless, diﬀerences in return migration behavior are also impor-
tant in explaining the country of origin variation in net contributions. For instance, even
though Spanish immigrants are less likely to be unemployed conditional on age compared
to Greek immigrants, their net contributions are lower because Spanish immigrants have a
lower average duration of residence and, therefore, their per-period net contributions, which
are positive until late ages, add up to a lower total amount over their duration of residence.
A sc a nb es e e nf r o mF i g u r e8 ,t h ea g e - a t - e n t r yp r o ﬁle of net UI contributions is ﬂatter
for non-EU immigrants, in particular for Turks. There are two competing eﬀects that bring
about this fact. On one hand, older arrivers have higher unemployment rates right after
arrival. On the other hand, since unemployment rates increase remarkably over time, when
younger arrivers reach the later part of their worklife, their unemployment rates at these
ages are higher than those of older arrivers at the same ages. For non-EU immigrants, in
particular for Turks, for whom unemployment rates rise more over time, this second eﬀect
is much stronger. Therefore, the diﬀerence in the likelihood of unemployment at any period
during the life-cycle between younger and older arrivers is smaller for non-EU immigrants,
which results in a ﬂatter age-at-entry proﬁle for them.
Certain features of return migration behavior also contribute to the ﬂatter age-at-entry
proﬁle for non-EU immigrants. As noted before, younger arrivers among non-EU immigrants
26are much less likely to return compared to older ones. In addition, return rates peak later
in the hump-shaped hazard function of non-EU immigrants. Therefore, younger arrivers
among non-EU immigrants are more likely to stay until later periods when unemployment
rates peak. This diminishes the gap in the likelihood of unemployment at any period in
Germany between the younger and older arrivers of non-EU immigrants, resulting in a ﬂatter
age-at-entry proﬁle.
8 Counterfactual: Exogenous Return Migration
The previous studies on the ﬁscal impact of immigrants treat return migration exogenously.
In order to analyze the impact of a such a restriction on immigrants’ net contributions to
the PI and UI systems, I eliminate the return migration decision in the model and instead
take an exogenous hazard function. In this exogenous modeling, hazard rates still vary by
duration of residence as well as nationality according to the estimated values in my model.
8.1 Pension Insurance
T h ei m p a c to fe x o g e n o u sr e t u r nm i g r a t i o no nn et contributions to the PI system varies sub-
stantially across unobserved types. Exogenous return migration decreases the level of return
migration for type 4s substantially. However, their net contributions do not change much
as their per-period contributions average close to zero due to their very high unemployment
r a t e s . M a n yo ft h et y p e4 sw h oa r ef o r c e dt os tay with exogenous return migration are
replaced by type 3s (stayer types), who have better labor market outcomes, as actual re-
turners. The resulting increase in the return r a t e so ft y p e3 sb r i n g sa b o u taf a l li nt h e i r
net lifetime contributions for all nationalities because their per-period net contributions are
positive. This fall for type 3s is especially remarkable for EU immigrants as they become
much more likely to return as a result of exogenous return migration.
Exogenous return migration shortens the average duration of residence of type 1s and 2s,
in particular that of type 1s, because they are more likely to return at later periods. Since per-
period net contributions are positive for these immigrants, the shorter duration of residence
that comes with exogenous return migration decreases their net lifetime contributions. At
the same time, there is a countervailing eﬀect: the level of return migration of these types
is higher than average; therefore, exogenous return migration brings about a fall in this
level, which increases net contributions. For type 1s, for whom the timing eﬀect is especially
27strong, net contributions fall for all nationalities, in particular for EU immigrants who are
forced to return much earlier. On the other hand, for type 2s, the level eﬀe c ti ss t r o n ga m o n g
non-EU immigrants due to the lower return rates imposed by exogenous migration for them.
In fact, the level eﬀect dominates for ex-Yugoslavians and their net contributions increase,
whereas they fall for all other nationalities, in particular for EU immigrants.
The impact of exogenous return migration on net PI contributions are illustrated in
Figure 9 by country of origin and age-at-arrival. For EU immigrants, the replacement of
many type 4s with type 3s as actual returners and the shortened duration of residence of
type 1s and 2s dominate, and net contributions decrease for almost all age-at-arrival groups.
The fall for certain age-at-arrival groups is especially large; e.g., net contributions fall by
more than 40 percent for all Italians who arrive after age 30. The fall in the net contributions
of Italians is larger because ﬁrst the fall in the duration of residence of type 1s and 2s is
larger as the return rates at earlier periods are the highest for Italians; second they have
a higher share of type 3s than other EU groups, most of whom are replaced by type 4s as
actual stayers. For Turks, the falls in the net contributions of type 2s and 3s dominate as
they have a higher share of these types, and their contributions fall for all but the oldest
age-at-arrival group. The fall in the net contributions of all Turks who arrive before age
forty is about 20 percent. Finally, for ex-Yugoslavians, the fall in the net contributions of
type 3s dominates, and their net contributions drop for all except for arrivers older than 40.
Exogenous modeling of return migration behavior also causes rotations on the age-at-
entry proﬁles of net PI contributions. The proﬁles of both non-EU countries rotate counter-
clockwise; e.g., among ex-Yugoslavians, while net contributions of 22-year-old entrants fall
by 17.3 percent, they rise by 9.9 percent for 44 year-old entrants. As noted before, older
arrivers among non-EU immigrants are much more likely to return. With exogenous return
migration, younger arrivers become more likely to return and older arrivers become more
likely to stay. Since per-period net contributions tend to be positive, net contributions of
younger arrivers change in a more negative way.
As can also be seen from Figure 9, the change in net contributions is more positive
for younger arrivers among EU immigrants; e.g., among Spanish immigrants, while net
contributions of 18-year-old entrants increase by 8.7 percent, those of 40-year-old entrants
decrease by 27 percent. For EU immigrants, exogenous return migration increases return
rates of older arrivers, thereby decreasing their net contributions. However, the diﬀerences
in return rates across age-at-entry groups are not as pronounced for EU countries as they
28are for non-EU countries. Nonetheless, there is a reinforcing timing explanation. Compared
to younger arrivers, older arrivers among EU immigrants are much less likely to return
at earlier periods and more likely to return at later periods. Therefore, exogenous return
migration makes the hazard function of older arrivers steeper and, therefore, decreases their
average duration of residence. Since per-period net contributions are likely to be positive, in
particular in earlier periods, the change for older arrivers is more negative.
8.2 Unemployment Insurance
As it was for the PI system, the impact of exogenous return migration on net contributions
to the UI system varies considerably across unobserved types. The most dramatic change
is for type 4s, who have the highest unemployment rates. Since exogenous return migra-
tion increases their average duration of stay, their net contributions fall remarkably for all
nationalities. For type 1s, exogenous return migration brings about a substantial drop in
duration of residence, especially for EU immigrants. Since type 1s have positive per-period
net contributions due to their low unemployment rates, their net lifetime contributions fall
for all nationalities, in particular for EU immigrants. Net contributions of type 2s among
EU immigrants fall also due to the shortened duration of residence with exogenous return.
Net contributions of type 2s among non-EU immigrants decrease as well; however, the pri-
mary reason in this case is not because they are forced to return earlier, but because they
a r ef o r c e dt os t a yl a t e r . T h er e t u r nr a t e so ft y p e2 sa r eh i g ha tt h ep e r i o d st h a tu n e m -
ployment rates peak. However, exogenous return migration forces type 2s among non-EU
immigrants to stay in Germany at these late periods of high unemployment, which results
in a fall in their net contributions. A parallel argument explains why net contributions of
type 3s among non-EU immigrants increase with exogenous return. With exogenous return
migration, many do not stay until periods of high unemployment that are realized after the
peak of the hump of the hazard function and, consequently, their net contributions increase.
On the contrary, net contributions of type 3s among EU immigrants fall. Since the return
rates of EU immigrants are the highest at very early periods (unlike non-EU immigrants
for whom the peak of the hump of the hazard function occurs much later) and since their
unemployment rates are not as high as that for non-EU immigrants, exogenous return forces
them to return at periods when their per-period contributions still average positive.
The above analysis indicates a fall in net contributions for EU immigrants regardless of
type and for all non-EU immigrants except for type 3s. The rise for type 3s among non-EU
29immigrants is dominated by the fall for all other types and, consequently, net contributions
fall for all nationalities regardless of age at arrival, which is illustrated in Figure 10. In
fact, net contributions become negative for all Turkish and Italian immigrants regardless of
age-at-arrival and for all ex-Yugoslavian, Greek and Spanish immigrants except for the very
young arrivers. Moreover, the magnitude of the fall is substantial for many groups; e.g., net
contributions of all Turks arriving after age 30 and all Italians arriving before age 40 fall by
more than 25,000 DM, which is almost equivalent to their annual earnings at arrival.
In Figure 10, a prominent feature is the clockwise rotation in the proﬁles of non-EU
countries. While net contributions of 18-year-old Turkish entrants fall by 1,162 DM, those
of 40-year-old Turkish entrants fall by 35,231 DM; in fact, net contributions of older arrivers
among Turks approach to -40,000 DM. Older arrivers among non-EU immigrants include a
much higher share of immigrants with low labor market ability and are much more likely to
return compared to younger arrivers. Therefore, exogenous return migration, which decreases
the return rates of older arrivers, brings about a remarkable fall in their net contributions.
9 Policy Experiment: Cash Bonuses Conditional on
Return
This section analyzes the impact of a counterfactual policy experiment in which cash bonuses
are provided to unemployed immigrants conditional on return to their home countries. Un-
employment rates of immigrants in Germany are very high. These unemployed workers draw
signiﬁcant amount of beneﬁts for extended periods of time. Moreover, they do not pay PI
taxes but their unemployment period counts toward the contribution period used in calcu-
lating pension beneﬁts. In addition, there is strong persistence in the unemployment state,
especially for older working-age immigrants. Therefore, rather than incurring these nega-
tive net contributions for extended periods of time, the German government could provide
one-time cash bonuses to unemployed immigrants conditional on return.
Table 7 presents the changes in the combined net lifetime contributions to the PI and UI
systems per immigrant brought about by various amounts of bonuses given to unemployed
workers at various periods in Germany according to nationality and selected values of age-
at-arrival.21 For EU immigrants, the policy turns out to be totally ineﬀective in increasing
21It is assumed that immigrants do not expect the implementation of such a policy. I experimented with
more restrictive policies like targeting the unemployed with longer spells of unemployment. The qualitative
30net contributions regardless of age-at-arrival: the changes are either trivial or negative. For
non-EU immigrants, the policy is also totally ineﬀective for young arrivers. As age-at-arrival
increases, the impact of the policy becomes stronger; however, this impact is still quite limited
for 30-year-old arrivers: even for Turks, for whom the policy matters the most, the rise in net
c o n t r i b u t i o n sa tt h ep e r i o d st h ep o l i c yi st h em o s te ﬀective (around the 8th period) is about
one percent. Moreover, when the impact of the policy is distributed over various values of
duration of residence, the change in net contributions would be rather small even for Turks.
The only demographic group for which this policy would have some bite is older arrivers
among non-EU immigrants, in particular Turks. The policy increases their net contributions
regardless of the period it is implemented and the changes in net contributions are bigger.
For instance, the implementation of a 30,000 DM bonus would increase net contributions of
40-year-old Turkish arrivers by more than 1,000 DM as the change in net contributions at all
p e r i o d si sa to ra b o v et h i sl e v e l .E v e na1 , 0 0 0D Mr i s ew o u l dm e a nr o u g h l yat h r e ep e r c e n t
increase in their net contributions.
The policy is totally ineﬀective for most demographic groups and only somewhat eﬀective
for few demographic groups because ﬁrst unemployed immigrants are more likely to return
anyway, therefore, providing cash bonuses becomes a return gift to many immigrants who
would return anyway; second, the change in the duration of residence brought about by the
policy is limited. This second point is illustrated in Figure 11, which shows the eﬀect a
50,000 DM bonus given to unemployed immigrants at the eight period in Germany for 30-
year-old and 40-year-old arrivers among Turkish immigrants.22 T h ep o l i c yi nf a c ti n c r e a s e s
the return rates at the period the bonus is given. However, as can also be seen from the
ﬁgure, the return rates at the periods immediately following the bonus period decrease. As
a result, the duration of residence of unemployed immigrants do not change much.
Figure 11 also explains the relative ineﬀectiveness of the policy among younger arrivers.
The impact of the policy on the hazard rate at the period it is implemented is smaller for
30-year-old arrivers; in addition, the fact that most of these extra-returners are those who
would return in the immediately following periods anyway is more apparent for 30-year-old
arrivers than 40-year-old arrivers (the gap in the survivor rates closes much faster for 30-
year-old arrivers). An important reason to the smaller eﬀect of the policy on the hazard
results do not change; the quantitative eﬀects are weaker.
22Eigth period is chosen because the impact of the policy is the strongest at this period. The reason that
a large amount of bonus and Turkish immigrants are chosen is the same.
31rates of younger arrivers is that their unemployment rates are high only at later periods
when their accumulated savings are also high.
In order to better understand the ineﬀectiveness of the policy for most demographic
groups, I next examine the impact of the policy by types. The impact of the bonus on
net contributions of type 3s (stayer type) is simply none because it does not change their
return behavior. The policy makes a very small impact on the return behavior of type 1s
because they are much less likely to qualify for the policy due to their lower-than-average
unemployment rates and they have a low propensity to return until late ages. On the other
hand, the policy makes a stronger impact on type 2s and 4s. The cash bonuses make a
stronger impact on the return migration behavior of type 2s because accumulated savings
matter the most for them in the value of spending the rest of their lives in their home country.
The shortened duration of residence for unemployed immigrants increases net contributions
of type 2s. The cash bonuses also make a stronger impact on the return migration of type 4s
because they are more likely to qualify for the policy due to their very high unemployment
rates. However, unlike the case for type 2s, the impact of the policy on net contributions of
type 4s is typically negative because since they have a very high likelihood of return anyway,
their duration of residence is shortened only slightly with the bonus.
The policy is more eﬀective on non-EU immigrants, in particular for Turks, because ﬁrst
a higher fraction of them qualify for the bonuses due to their higher unemployment rates,
second they include a higher share of type 2s for whom the change in net contributions is
positive whereas EU immigrants include a higher share of type 4s for whom the change in
net contributions is more negative.
10 Conclusions
In this paper, I investigate the impact of immigrants on the pension and unemployment
insurance systems in Germany when return migration is an endogenous choice. For this
purpose, I structurally estimate a stochastic dynamic model of joint return migration and
saving decisions of immigrants, using a rich longitudinal data set that includes immigrants
from ﬁve diﬀerent source countries in Germany. The estimation results indicate that the
model can account for the main features of the data very well. In addition, certain out-of-
sample predictions of the model yield quite comparable results.
Net contributions of immigrants from the ﬁve source countries in this study to the Ger-
32man PI system are positive regardless of age-at—entry. Moreover, the magnitudes of the
net contributions are substantial for certain demographic groups; e.g., compared to their
annual earnings-at-arrival, net contributions are 3.6 times as much for 18-year-old Turkish
arrivers and 4.2 times as much for 18-year-old ex-Yugoslavian arrivers. One key factor that
contributes to the positive net contributions to the PI system is the later average age of re-
tirement of immigrants, which arises as a result of the fact that many in-migrants who return
to their home country can not take advantage of the various early retirement schemes in Ger-
many. Net contributions to the UI system also average positive regardless of age-at-arrival
for all nationalities but Turks for whom net contributions are close to zero. This is surpris-
ing given the high unemployment rates of immigrants residing in Germany. The underlying
reason to this fact is that immigrants who returned to their home countries were much less
likely to be unemployed during their residence in Germany due to low unemployment rates
at early years after arrival.
Return migration behavior plays a signiﬁcant role in determining net contributions of
immigrants to the both insurance systems. This is best illustrated in this paper by a counter-
factual that treats return migration exogenously—as it has been the practice of the literature
so far—while preserving the actual return rates by country of origin and duration of residence.
Such exogenous modeling of return migration causes a serious misestimation of net contri-
butions. Net contributions to the PI system fall for almost all demographic groups, and this
fall is quite substantial for many groups; e.g., net contributions of all Italians arriving after
age 30 fall by more than 40 percent and those of all Turks arriving before age 40 fall by
about 20 percent. Net contributions to the UI system also fall for all nationalities regardless
of age-at-arrival as a result of exogenous return; in fact, they turn negative for all Turkish
and Italian immigrants regardless of age-at-arrival, and for all ex-Yugoslavian, Greek and
Spanish immigrants except for the very young arrivers. In addition, the magnitude of the
fall is remarkable for many groups; e.g. net contributions of all Turks arriving after age 30
and all Italians arriving before age 40 fall by more than 25,000 DM, which is almost equal
to their annual earnings at arrival. The main reason to the underestimation of the net gain
of PI and UI systems from immigrants when return migration is treated exogenously is that
this ignores the selection in return migration in terms of employment status. In particular,
exogenous modeling does not capture the fact that unemployed immigrants are more likely
to return and, therefore, seriously underestimates net contributions.
Storesletten (2000) claims that admitting 40-44 year-old immigrants would be the best
33immigration policy in the U.S. according to age-at-entry proﬁles of net contributions. How-
ever, my study shows that not accounting for the heterogeneity in the return migration
behavior across age-at-entry groups causes serious rotations in the age-at-entry proﬁles of
net contributions in Germany. For instance, for Spanish immigrants while net PI contribu-
tions of 18-year-old entrants increase by 8.7 percent, those of 40-year-old entrants fall by
27 percent; for Turkish immigrants while net UI contributions of 40-year-old entrants fall
by 35,231 DM, those of 18-year-old entrants decrease by only 1,162 DM. The underlying
reason to these rotations is that exogenous return migration does not acknowledge the sig-
niﬁcant variation in the level and timing of return migration as well as in terms of permanent
unobserved characteristics across age-at-entry groups. In particular, the facts that older ar-
rivers among non-EU immigrants include a higher fraction of immigrants with lower labor
market ability and display signiﬁcantly higher return migration rates and that the hazard
function of younger arrivers among EU immigrants has a much steeper downward-slope are
not accounted for by exogenous return migration.
In order to prevent the burden of unemployed immigrants on the state coﬀers, some host
countries adopted policies to motivate these immigrants to return to their home countries.
The results of a counterfactual policy experiment in which cash bonuses are given to unem-
ployed workers conditional on return reveal that such policies are not likely to be eﬀective
because ﬁrst since unemployed immigrants are more likely to return, the bonus becomes a
gift to many immigrants who would return anyway; second, even though this policy brings
about some additional returners, many of these extra-returners are those who would return
in the immediately following periods anyway.
Accounting for return migration as an endogenous choice in studying the ﬁscal impact
of immigration would be quite important in many other countries as well. The empirical
literature from various countries reports that emigrants are selected in terms of characteristics
like education and earnings ability, which would inﬂuence their ﬁscal impact [see, e.g., Reagan
and Olsen (2000) for the U.S.; Lam (1994) for Canada; Jensen and Pedersen (2007) for
Denmark; Rooth and Saarela (2007) for Finland and Sweden]. Moreover, the institutional
structure of the social security system inﬂuences the timing of emigration; e.g., Duleep (1994)
reports that there is a rise in the emigration rate right after ten years of residence in the
U.S., which is the minimum qualiﬁcation period for pension beneﬁts. In addition, variation
in return migration behavior across age-at-entry groups is also reported in other countries
[see, e.g., Reagan and Olsen (2000) for the U.S.; Jensen and Pedersen (2007) for Denmark].
34Therefore, my ﬁnding that examining immigrants’ impact on the state coﬀers while treating
return migration exogenously yields results that are signiﬁcantly oﬀ the mark in Germany
is likely to carry over to other countries as well.
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39TABLE 1: Data on Purchasing Power Parity and Expected Wages in the Source Countries
  Turkey Yugoslavia Greece Italy Spain
Purchasing Power Parity 2.2 2.5 1.6 1.3 1.4
Expected Wage / Expected Wage Turkey 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.6 1.3
Notes: Expected wage ratio is at purchasing power parity. Wages are for the manufacturing sector. Since most of the Italian
immigrants are from the southern part of the country, I account for the differences in prices between the South and the North
by taking the ppp 10% higher, wages 10% lower than the national averages (Source: Istituto Di Studi E Analisi Economica,
2004). Wage data are taken from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics webpage and Freeman and Oostendorp (2000), and data on
the replacement rates of unemployment benefits from OECD Benefits and Wages Indicators (2002). The source for purchasing
power parity data is OECD (2002).
TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics: Immigrant Characteristics
Mean SD Min Max
Turkish 0.422 0.46 0 1
ex-Yugoslavian 0.233 0.41 0 1
Greek 0.092 0.35 0 1
Italian 0.198 0.40 0 1
Spanish 0.056 0.35 0 1
Age at Arrival
A l l 2 7 . 4 6 . 6 91 84 9
T u r k i s h 2 8 . 3 6 . 0 41 84 8
ex-Yugoslavian 27.7 6.11 18 45
G r e e k 2 8 . 0 6 . 7 11 84 9
I t a l i a n 2 5 . 0 7 . 3 01 84 9
S p a n i s h 2 7 . 4 7 . 0 11 84 8
Year of Immigration
All 1969.6 5.11 1952 1983
Turkish 1970.5 4.02 1960 1981
ex-Yugoslavian 1970.0 3.64 1957 1981
Greek 1968.1 5.49 1957 1982
Italian 1968.8 6.72 1952 1983
Spanish 1965.9 4.78 1958 1983
Years of Residence Until Last Survey
All 22.9 8.05 1 48
Turkish 21.7 7.37 3 40
ex-Yugoslavian 23.8 7.00 5 43
Greek 24.0 8.67 4 43
Italian 23.3 9.85 1 48
Spanish 25.1 7.04 3 37
Notes: Sampling weights for 1984 are used.
40TABLE 3: Type Proportions over Duration of Residence
period 0 5 10 15 20 25
Type 1 0.065 0.077 0.078 0.047 0.012 0.000
Type 2 0.297 0.334 0.170 0.057 0.012 0.000
Type 3 0.415 0.542 0.745 0.895 0.976 1.000
Type 4 0.223 0.048 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.000
ex-YUGOSLAVIAN
Type 1 0.048 0.052 0.051 0.032 0.010 0.000
Type 2 0.272 0.262 0.148 0.078 0.030 0.000
Type 3 0.549 0.640 0.790 0.889 0.959 1.000
Type 4 0.132 0.046 0.011 0.002 0.000 0.000
GREEK
Type 1 0.384 0.563 0.662 0.650 0.477 0.023
Type 2 0.162 0.227 0.149 0.087 0.057 0.000
Type 3 0.082 0.129 0.174 0.261 0.466 0.977
Type 4 0.371 0.081 0.015 0.003 0.001 0.000
ITALIAN
Type 1 0.174 0.362 0.383 0.327 0.226 0.004
Type 2 0.056 0.117 0.083 0.034 0.020 0.000
Type 3 0.189 0.430 0.524 0.637 0.754 0.996
Type 4 0.581 0.092 0.011 0.002 0.000 0.000
SPANISH
Type 1 0.203 0.436 0.569 0.581 0.407 0.027
Type 2 0.127 0.262 0.186 0.111 0.068 0.000
Type 3 0.061 0.140 0.213 0.301 0.525 0.973
Type 4 0.609 0.162 0.032 0.007 0.001 0.000
TURKISH
41TABLE 4: Fit of Hazard Rates by Duration of Residence and EU Status
Period Actual Predicted Chi2 Period Actual Predicted Chi2
2 0.000 0.047 0.54 2 0.195 0.161 0.11
3 0.027 0.041 0.12 3 0.114 0.119 0.01
4 0.020 0.039 0.25 4 0.057 0.084 0.30
5 0.040 0.043 0.01 5 0.025 0.068 1.23
6 0.064 0.048 0.87 6 0.055 0.054 0.00
7 0.042 0.055 0.89 7 0.040 0.050 0.28
8 0.075 0.055 2.90 8 0.151 0.050 39.21
9 0.053 0.057 0.10 9 0.049 0.053 0.05
10 0.034 0.049 1.73 10 0.034 0.053 1.64
11 0.064 0.045 2.69 11 0.048 0.052 0.06
12 0.054 0.042 1.05 12 0.045 0.058 0.84
13 0.007 0.032 5.08 13 0.061 0.060 0.01
14 0.025 0.030 0.13 14 0.047 0.054 0.21
15 0.019 0.027 0.23 15 0.087 0.064 1.35
16 0.051 0.025 1.49 16 0.031 0.066 2.44
17 0.000 0.020 0.65 17 0.085 0.059 1.02
18 0.038 0.020 0.24 18 0.129 0.067 3.00
19 0.000 0.023 0.14 19 0.051 0.082 0.36
Non-EU Immigrants EU Immigrants
42TABLE 5: Fit of Unemployment Rates by Duration of Residence and EU Status
Period Actual Predicted Chi2 Period Actual Predicted Chi2
0 0.022 0.008 11.73 0 0.017 0.004 20.96
1 0.019 0.011 3.04 1 0.001 0.006 2.37
2 0.016 0.015 0.02 2 0.003 0.008 1.28
3 0.006 0.021 5.50 3 0.002 0.012 3.60
4 0.005 0.026 8.71 4 0.003 0.012 3.15
5 0.020 0.030 1.63 5 0.008 0.013 0.86
6 0.033 0.038 0.33 6 0.006 0.016 3.04
7 0.060 0.047 1.64 7 0.004 0.021 6.26
8 0.080 0.059 3.30 8 0.023 0.024 0.03
9 0.068 0.070 0.02 9 0.013 0.030 3.57
10 0.080 0.088 0.27 10 0.026 0.037 1.20
11 0.124 0.105 1.06 11 0.056 0.041 1.67
12 0.138 0.156 0.64 12 0.055 0.054 0.00
13 0.189 0.185 0.02 13 0.094 0.072 1.58
14 0.303 0.236 3.68 14 0.103 0.097 0.06
15 0.308 0.292 0.11 15 0.102 0.121 0.44
16 0.305 0.334 0.16 16 0.157 0.158 0.00
17 0.345 0.403 0.40 17 0.119 0.152 0.56
18 0.522 0.469 0.14 18 0.199 0.208 0.02
Non-EU Immigrants EU Immigrants
TABLE 6: Fit of Proportion of Retired by Age and EU Status
Age Actual Predicted Chi2 Age Actual Predicted Chi2
40 0.008 0.004 1.74 40 0.000 0.001 0.39
42 0.012 0.007 1.59 42 0.001 0.002 0.27
44 0.017 0.013 0.49 44 0.001 0.004 0.89
46 0.033 0.022 2.27 46 0.012 0.008 0.78
48 0.041 0.036 0.20 48 0.020 0.015 0.55
50 0.049 0.056 0.23 50 0.021 0.026 0.29
52 0.051 0.082 3.01 52 0.028 0.044 1.60
54 0.094 0.115 0.87 54 0.042 0.069 2.63
56 0.179 0.154 0.77 56 0.127 0.104 1.14
58 0.230 0.201 0.66 58 0.137 0.143 0.05
60 0.420 0.458 0.46 60 0.312 0.288 0.33
62 0.467 0.498 0.18 62 0.564 0.526 0.49
64 0.589 0.618 0.11 64 0.672 0.716 0.48
66 0.935 0.849 1.04 66 0.894 0.956 2.94
68 0.881 0.933 0.34 68 1.000 0.993 0.13
Non-EU Immigrants EU Immigrants
43TABLE 7: Change in Total PI and UI Net Contributions per Immigrant with Cash
Bonuses to the Unemployed (DM, 1998 prices)
Age at Arrival = 20
Turkish Yugoslavi Greek Italian Spanish Turkish Yugoslavi Greek Italian Spanish
Bonus Amount
20,000 -21 -1 -25 -26 -20 -43 -9 -8 -12 20
30,000 -26 2 -35 -39 -28 -39 -18 -15 -8 19
40,000 -21 3 -43 -53 -41 -18 7 -14 -17 8
50,000 -15 3 -52 -66 -52 -22 8 -29 -26 -6
20,000 13 5 -17 -11 -2 -7 6 9 -13 10
3 0 , 0 0 0 1 5 1 5 2 0 - 1 1 - 2 00000
40,000 2 9 37 -16 -10 0 -9 32 -3 -9
50,000 -1 -4 25 -16 -15 7 -15 31 -2 -1
Age at Arrival = 30
Turkish Yugoslavi Greek Italian Spanish Turkish Yugoslavi Greek Italian Spanish
Bonus Amount
20,000 -7 13 -61 -159 -63 207 114 44 -79 22
30,000 -55 -4 -84 -196 -91 457 185 40 -117 -4
40,000 -2 24 -112 -256 -124 559 256 -2 -161 -16
50,000 3 44 -142 -303 -155 480 335 10 -220 -41
20,000 674 23 28 51 -8 142 33 92 20 15
30,000 775 13 26 68 -35 274 43 77 29 -1
40,000 698 90 51 58 -49 239 25 90 30 -3
50,000 518 129 77 22 -34 172 23 69 18 -19
Age at Arrival = 40
Turkish Yugoslavi Greek Italian Spanish Turkish Yugoslavi Greek Italian Spanish
Bonus Amount
20,000 51 -117 -198 -520 -319 2,230 432 0 -93 -16
30,000 978 -44 -239 -639 -366 1,993 971 48 -123 -54
40,000 672 248 -270 -789 -446 1,605 1,329 109 -199 -63
50,000 287 416 -313 -908 -525 1,168 1,133 90 -328 -94
20,000 2,337 353 47 19 -19 1,266 78 71 18 -5
30,000 2,027 637 142 50 -26 1,032 245 154 50 -3
40,000 1,606 1,031 203 18 3 678 160 129 18 -13
50,000 1,140 801 124 -38 -39 297 -20 54 -42 -98
Period=6 (Age=52) Period=8 (Age=56)
Period=8 (Age=46) Period=12 (Age=54)
Period=2 (Age=44) Period=4 (Age=48)
Period=2 (Age=34) Period=4 (Age=38)
Period=4 (Age=28) Period=8 (Age=36)
Period=12 (Age=44) Period=16 (Age=52)





















Note: A period is two years of residence





















Note: A period is two years of residence. Savings are censored below at zero because the saving question is asked only for positive savings.
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47FIGURE 8: Net Lifetime Contributions to Pension Insurance and Unemployment Insur-
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FIGURE 9: Eﬀect of Exogenous Return Migration on Net Pension Insurance Contribu-






























48FIGURE 10: Eﬀect of Exogenous Return Migration on Net Unemployment Insurance
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FIGURE 11: Impact of a Cash Bonus Given to the Unemployed on Return Migration



















Note: 50,000DM given to unemployed workers at the 8th period.
49A DETAILS OF LABOR AND TRANSFER INCOME IN GERMANY
A.1 Labor Income in Germany
A.1.1 Social Security Contributions
Pension insurance contribution is applied at a rate of 9.35% (τp) and unemployment insurance contribution
is applied at a rate of 2.15% (τu), both up to a earnings maximum of 85,000 DM (y
max) (1998 prices).
The health insurance contribution is applied at a rate of 7% (τh) up to a earnings maximum of 0.75ymax.
Earnings below 6,000 DM (y
min)(1998 prices) are exempt from social security taxes. Thus, total security
taxes, Γ(.) can be written as follows:
Γ(yt)=
0 if yt ≤ ymin
(τp + τu + τh)yt if ymin < yt ≤ 0.75ymax
(τp + τu)yt + τhymax,1 if 0.75ymax < yt ≤ ymax




t , are gross earnings net of social security contributions and income taxes. In (12),
τ [yt − Γ(yt)] is the average income tax rate foryt−Γ(yt), gross earnings net of social security contributions.
τ(.) is calculated according to the marginal tax rate schedule in Germany. According to this, income below
subsistence income is tax free. Above that level, the marginal tax rate rises from 22% to 56% up to an
earnings level of 120,000 DM in 1998 prices. (These numbers are chosen to average the values for the years
1965 to 2000—the source is German Ministry of Finance, 2004.) There have been very small changes in the
social security contribution and income tax rates over time. I assume that immigrants expect these rates to
stay at these levels when they make forecasts about the future in the forward-looking nature of the model.
ynet
t =(1− τ [yt − Γ(yt)])[yt − Γ(yt)] (12)
A.2 Transfer Income in Germany
A.2.1 Unemployment Beneﬁts and Unemployment Assistance
The entitlement duration to unemployment beneﬁts varies from 180 to 960 days depending on the age and
experience of the worker. For unemployed workers with at least one child, unemployment beneﬁts are equal
to 67% of their last net earnings whereas unemployment assistance is equal to 57% of their last net earnings.
I make a number of modeling simpliﬁcations for tractability. I take unemployment beneﬁts and assistance
at any period as the above percentages of expected net earnings at that period rather than the realized last
net earnings. In addition, I take the duration of entitlement to unemployment beneﬁts as two years (one
decision period). This assumption along with the fact that a period of employment in the model results in
50qualiﬁcation for beneﬁts in the consecutive period implies that an immigrant who is unemployed this period
but was employed last period receives unemployed beneﬁts, whereas an immigrant who has been unemployed
for two or more consecutive periods receives unemployment assistance. Finally, I assume that after four years
(two periods) of residence all immigrants qualify for unemployment beneﬁts so that last period’s labor market
status can give us suﬃcient information on qualiﬁcation for beneﬁts. (It would be impossible to maintain
residence status after 4 years of unemployment for non-EU immigrants. Moreover, many of the guestworkers
were already assigned to German employers at the time of entry. Besides, further residence after four years
of unemployment would be very unlikely for any economic migrant with zero earnings.) Thus, earnings of
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if (lt = unemployed and lt−1 = unemployed and qualiﬁed for beneﬁts)
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(13)
A.2.2 Pension Beneﬁts
All three diﬀerent paths to retirement—regular retirement schemes after age 60, disability, and pre-retirement—
in fact pay the same level of beneﬁt. In order to qualify for disability beneﬁts, a worker must pass an earnings
test. If he passes the stricter earnings test, he is qualiﬁed for full beneﬁts. If he can pass only the weaker
earnings test, he receives two-thirds of his old-age pension. However, Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2004) report
that these rules were interpreted very broadly in the 1970s and the early 1980s, and, as a result, the vast
majority of the workers received full beneﬁts. In addition, Börsch-Supan et al. (2002) report that even
though pre-retirement income is subject to a negotiation between the worker and the employer, the resulting
level generally tracks the public insurance beneﬁts closely.
According to Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999), the replacement rate—deﬁned as the ratio of net pension
beneﬁts to average net earnings while employed—for a worker with a forty-ﬁve year earnings history and
average lifetime earnings is 72 percent. In addition, pension beneﬁts are proportional to the duration of
contribution. Therefore, for a worker with average lifetime earnings, each additional year of earnings history
amounts to a 1.6 percent increase in the replacement rate. (I ignore the adjustment factors for late retirement.
Late retirement is very uncommon due to the strong incentives for early-retirement in the German retirement
system. Moreover, the importance of these adjustment factors is diminished after accounting for the increase
51in beneﬁts due to the longer years of service life. In addition, the 1992 reform introduced a penalty to
the replacement rate in the case of early retirement. The additional penalty is rather small. The pre-1992
replacement rate and that in the model for early retirement decreases due to a shorter service life only.)
For tractability, I generalize this property for the worker with average lifetime earnings to all workers. This
assumes that the replacement rate does not depend on the relative income level of workers, i.e., there is no
redistribution. Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999) claim that there is in fact very little redistribution in the
German PI system, except for those with very high incomes (those whose incomes are three times as much
as the national average). Due to the relatively low income levels of immigrants in Germany, there is a very
tiny of fraction of them in this income range.
Again for tractability, in calculating pension beneﬁts at period t, I assume that the replacement rate
is applied to the average of expected net earnings at all periods until period t rather than to the average
of realized net earnings. When the replacement rate of 0.016t is applied on the average of expected net
earnings, the level of pension beneﬁts is found; namely
y
p
















A.2.3 Social Assistance for Subsistence Income
Subsistence income for a family depends on its size and varies across states. In 1998, the payment for the
head of the household averaged around 520 DM across states. The spouse of the household head receives 80%
of this amount and there is an additional payment for each child, which varies from 50% to 90% depending
on the age of the child. Since marital status and number of children are strongly correlated with immigrants’
age and nationality, I write the subsistence level income, ysubs
t , as 520DM times a family multiplier that
varies by age and nationality.
B EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS






µ5I(aget ≤ 24) + µ6I(aget ≤ 30)+
µ7I(aget ≥ 50) + µ8I(aget ≥ 60) + µ9I(aget ≥ 70)
#
(15)




(1 + ρ0age0)ρkI(type = k)+ρ4+kI(type = k)t (16)
52B.3 Labor Market Status
P(l = j)=
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣












γ17(j−1)+13+tI(age =6 0+2 t)+γ17(j−1)+17I(age = 62)I(z ≥ 3)
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γ17(h−1)+13+tI(age =6 0+2 t)+γ17(h−1)+17I(age = 62)I(z ≥ 3)
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
j =1 ,2 (17)
P(l =0 )=1− P(l =1 )− P(l =2 ) (18)
B.4 Human Capital






υ6+kI(type = k) (19)
B.5 Type Probability Functions
κk =
"





















































B.7 Preferences for Living in the Home Country
The value of spending the remaining lifetime in the home country, given in (22), has four components: A
baseline country dummy, the value of accumulated savings in Germany—where savings are interacted with
53purchasing power parity between the source country and Germany—, the value of potential earnings in the
home country after return—which shifts according to the ratio of expected wages in source countries—, and
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Next, I give a more detailed explanation of the individual terms in (22).
1st term (Country Dummy): This is the discounted sum of per period country dummies, π0,z, which
measure the general attractiveness of source countries compared to Germany. It would depend on source
country characteristics like per capita income level, whether the country has a socialist regime, income
inequality, political stability and so forth. This dummy also includes the transportation cost of return,
which would vary by country of origin according to its distance from Germany. In addition, it accounts
for the institutional diﬀerence between the EU and non-EU countries in that non-EU immigrants can not
engage in repeat migration to Germany after they make a permanent return to their home countries.
2nd term (Value of Accumulated Savings): The interaction of accumulated savings with ppp enters the
value function in an inverse exponential form. Both parameters of the inverse exponential function vary
with the remaining lifetime of the migrant, paget=( last_age
z−aget)/2. Moreover, both parameters are
allowed to vary across the unobserved types.
3rd term (Value of Potential Earnings at Home): The present discounted value of immigrants’ utility
from their earnings in their home country after return would depend on their age at return as well as the





the ratio of the expected wage level in country z to that in Turkey.
4th term (Value of German Pension Beneﬁts): Pension beneﬁts depend on immigrants’ duration of
residence in an inverse exponential functional form. (Recall that duration of time in the labor market is





accounts for the diﬀerent purchasing power of German pension
beneﬁts in diﬀerent source countries. ∆age, given in (22), discounts the value of the beneﬁts to the period
54of return decision. (An immigrant can start receiving pension beneﬁts only after age 64.)














In equation (22), the variation according to nationality is limited to four sources: π0,z —the baseline
country dummy—, pppz —the purchasing power in the source country compared to Germany—, and ˆ wz/ˆ w
Turk
— the ratio of expected wages in source countries when the baseline country is taken as Turkey, and is the
number of remaining lifetime periods. (Recall that longevity varies by nationality.)
B.8 Bequest Function
The parameters of the bequest function is a subset of the parameters of the second term of V L(e St). It



















C DETAILS OF THE ESTIMATION METHOD
The classiﬁcation error parameters and parameters that characterize the distribution of measurement errors
are estimated along with the other parameters of the model. The only element of the model that is estimated
separately is the family size multiplier used in calculating the subsistence income, which involves nonpara-
metric smoothing of the age proﬁles of the probability of being married and the mean number of children
by nationality and then applying the rules of the social assistance program on these smoothed values.
C.1 Classiﬁcation Errors
C.1.1 Unbiased Classiﬁc a t i o nE r r o ri nt h eL a b o rM a r k e tO u t c o m e s
Classiﬁcation errors are unbiased when the probability of a particular outcome is the same in the simulations
a n di nt h ed a t a .L e tl∗
it denote the observed labor market outcome in the data and lit denote the true value
from the simulations. Following Keane and Wolpin’s (2001) methodology, I write the classiﬁcation errors in








it =1 |lit 6=1 )=( 1− e E)b P(lit =1 ) ) (26)





Pr(lint =1 ) (27)
55e E, in (25) and (26), is the parameter measuring the extent of classiﬁcation error, which is transformed
as in (28) in the estimation. E is estimated along with the other parameters of the model.
e E =1 /[1 + exp(E)] (28)
C.1.2 Biased Classiﬁcation Error in Return Migration
The classiﬁcation error in return migration outcomes has two important properties. First, a classiﬁcation
error is possible only when the reported choice is to leave because the fact that a migrant was interviewed
does not leave any doubt that he was in fact in Germany. This implies that a classiﬁcation error can exist
only in the last period in the sample. Second, the fact that there may be a classiﬁcation error only if the
observed choice is to leave implies that the classiﬁcation error is biased. Thus, P(m∗
t =1 )6= P(mt =1 ) .













t =0 |mt =1 )=0 (30)
C.2 Measurement Errors
The measurement error distributions of earnings and saving are independent and serially uncorrelated. They
are speciﬁed in the following way.









C.2.2 Measurement Error in Savings




C.3 Calculation of the Probabilities of Reported Spells Conditional on the Simulated Spells
















56C.3.1 Calculation of P(Mobs
i |Msim
in )
The calculation of the probability of observing the registered migration spell conditional on the true migration
spell can be categorized into four groups:
Case 1: The simulated spell ends earlier with an exit.
D a t a 0000X
S i m u l a t e d0001






C a s e2 :T h ed a t aa n ds i m u l a t e ds p e l lb o t he n dw i t ha ne x i ta tt h es a m ep e r i o d .
D a t a 00001
S i m u l a t e d00001
There are T1 periods of correct reporting of staying in Germany as well as correct reporting of the exit.
The probability of correct of reporting of an exit, θ
m








Case 3: The data spell ends earlier with an exit.
D a t a 00001. . .
S i m u l a t e d00000000
There are T1 periods of correct reporting of staying in Germany and T − T1 periods of mismatch (clas-











D a t a 00001. . .
S i m u l a t e d00000001
There are T1 periods of correct reporting of staying in Germany and T − T1 − 1 periods of mismatch











Case 4: The data spell ends earlier without an exit.
D a t a 00000. .
S i m u l a t e d000000X









C.3.2 Calculation of P(lobs
i |lsim
in )
Unlike the above case, a classiﬁcation error in the reported labor market status can exist at any period.
Therefore, the probability of observing the reported labor market status conditional on the simulated outcome











C.3.3 Calculation of P((At+1 − At)obs
i |(At+1 − At)sim
in )
The saving data in the GSOEP are censored below at zero. (Since I aggregate the data into two year periods,
there are censoring values other than zero as well.) For censored observations, the probability that At+1−At
equals the censoring value is given in (36), where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
P((At+1 − At)obs









For uncensored observations, the probability is given in (37), where φ is the standard normal density.
P((At+1 − At)obs
































µ1 µ2 µ3 µ4 µ5 µ6 µ7 µ8 µ9
8.217 4.539 6.003 4.189 −0.361 −0.146 −1.929b −2.324b −1.929b
(0.074) (0.248) (0.279) (0.013) (0.059) (0.006) (0.232) (0.278) (0.297) ______________________________________________________________
Psychic Cost Parameters
ρ0 ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 ρ5 ρ6 ρ7 ρ8
0.899b 0.458h 0.452h 0.387h 0.678h 1.071a 5.323 6.503 2.198a
(0.032) (0.017) (0.010) (0.256) (0.011) (0.293) (0.093) (0.001) (0.167) _____________________________________________________________
Value Home Parameters
π0,1 π0,2 π0,3 π0,4 π0,5 π1,1 π1,2 π1,3 π1,4 π1,5 π1,6
−2.334g −3.109g −0.841g −0.334g −0.424g −0.732 −0.271 −0.128 2.969 −0.614 −0.685
(0.038) (0.150) (0.262) (0.013) (0.050) (0.041) (0.075) (0.005) (0.024) (0.053) (0.005)
π1,7 π1,8 π1,9 π1,10 π2,1 π2,2 π2,3 π2,4 π3,1 π3,2 π3,3
12.29 9.161 −0.418d 0.590e −0.171 1.236h −1.824 −0.325g −2.254 9.769 −5.200b
(0.031) (0.135) (0.012) (0.065) (0.097) (0.063) (0.090) (0.008) (0.181) (0.017) (0.110) _____________________________________________________________
58Type Probability Function
κ1 κ2 κ3 κ4 κ5 κ6 κ7 κ8 κ9 κ10 κ11
1.197 2.821b −2.093b 2.207a −2.136 −2.389 −1.736 2.549 −7.355b 8.241b 5.897a
(0.509) (0.286) (0.368) (0.451) (0.646) (0.950) (1.425) (0.379) (0.150) (0.375) (0.478)
κ12 κ13 κ14 κ15 κ16 κ17 κ18 κ19 κ20 κ21
−4.186 −2.536 −3.846 9.702a 2.288b −4.803b −2.125a −7.600a 4.109a 3.601a
(0.448) (0.925) (0.899) (0.395) (0.202) (0.327) (0.371) (0.351) (0.783) (0.848) _____________________________________________________________
Labor Market Status
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 γ6 γ7 γ8 γ9
−10.394 0.047 −2.469 0.423 −0.291b −0.346 −2.323 −1.996 −1.972
(0.039) (0.001) (0.108) (0.002) (0.001) (0.118) (0.149) (0.152) (0.189)
γ10 γ11 γ12 γ13 γ14 γ15 γ16 γ17 γ18
−3.033 −3.512 −3.482 2.141 −1.469 0.863 0.973 3.539 11.421
(0,072) (0.087) (0.076) (0.132) (0.043) (0.134) (0.110) (0.168) (0.023)
γ19 γ20 γ21 γ22 γ23 γ24 γ25 γ26 γ27
0.043 −5.493 −2.501a 0.118b 0.359 0.888 0.847 1.307 −0.525
(0.001) (0.035) (0.007) (0.001) (0.028) (0.100) (0.023) (0.036) (0.089)
γ28 γ29 γ30 γ31 γ32 γ33 γ34
−1.699a −2.541 0.629 0.493 −0.388 −1.120 −1.201a





3 υ4 υ5 υ6 υ7 υ8 υ9 υ10
0.182a −0.907d −0.333b 0.716a 0.626a −0.228a 0.992a −0.195 −0.155a 0.254a
(0.004) (0.106) (0.008) (0.076) (0.101) (0.042) (0.077) (0.006) (0.021) (0.019) _____________________________________________________________
Classiﬁcation and Measurement Errors, Transitory Shocks
EF σ y,m σs,m
−1.715 −6.607 0.3086 1.060h





(0.0071) (0.0096) (0.0007) _____________________________________________________________
Discount Rates, Interest Rate, Risk Aversion Parameter, Price of Human Capital
δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 rλ p e
0.9750 0.9890 0.9806 0.9764 1.5685b,i 0.6304 11.4085j
(0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0276) (0.0004) (0.0038) _____________________________________________________________
NOTES: a - Parameter multiplied by 10; b - Parameter multiplied by 100; c - Parameter multiplied by
1,000; d - Parameter multiplied by 100,000; e - Parameter multiplied by 1,000,000; f - Parameter multiplied
by 100,000,000; g - Parameter divided by 1,000; h - Parameter divided by 10,000; i - This is the annual
interest rate; j - Parameter in text is an exponential transformation of this.
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